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ABSTRACT 
  This Article debunks the idea that a federal statute’s novelty is an 
indication that the statute violates constitutional principles of 
federalism or the separation of powers. In the last six years, every 
Justice on the Supreme Court has signed onto the idea that legislative 
novelty signals that a statute is unconstitutional. Many courts of appeals 
have also latched onto antinovelty rhetoric, two doing so in the course 
of finding federal statutes unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s 
rhetoric about legislative novelty originated as an observation: the 
Court described a statute as novel when distinguishing that statute from 
other, constitutionally permissible ones. Since then, the Court has 
weaponized its rhetoric about legislative novelty such that a federal 
statute’s novelty is now a “telling indication” that the statute is 
unconstitutional.  
  This Article urges the Court to abandon this rhetoric. The idea that 
legislative novelty is a sign that a statute is unconstitutional primarily 
rests on the mistaken Madisonian premise that Congress reliably 
exercises the full scope of its constitutional powers and that prior 
Congresses’ failure to enact a statute shows that prior Congresses 
assumed that the statute was unconstitutional. But there are myriad 
reasons why Congress does not enact statutes: enacting federal laws is 
difficult—in part because of constitutional requirements—and 
Copyright © 2017 Leah M. Litman. 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Mario Barnes, Alex 
Camacho, Jennifer Chacón, Erwin Chemerinsky, Seth Davis, Daniel Deacon, Dan Burk, Dick 
Fallon, Catherine Fisk, Bryant Garth, Jonathan Glater, Michele Goodwin, Rick Hasen, Don 
Herzog, Summer Kim, Mike Klarman, Christopher Leslie, John Manning, Tim Sellers, Greg 
Shaffer, and Ken Simons for their helpful and generous feedback, as well as Christina O’Tousa 
and the other editors of the Duke Law Journal for their great work on what turned out to be a 
very long article. 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
1408  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1407 
Congress legislates in response to existing conditions, which change 
over time. There are also many reasons why Congress may not 
innovate and why Congress may not have enacted every 
constitutionally permissible means of regulation. This Article suggests 
that there may be a more limited role for legislative novelty to play in 
areas of underenforced constitutional norms where courts have 
struggled to articulate workable doctrinal rules. Even then, a statute’s 
novelty should carry little weight in any determination about the 
statute’s constitutionality. Finally, this Article reflects on whether 
rejecting the Court’s rhetoric about legislative novelty necessarily calls 
into question the idea that a history of similar congressional statutes is 
evidence that a statute is constitutional.  
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[S]ometimes “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem is the lack of historical precedent” for Congress’s action.  
—Chief Justice John Roberts1 
[A] doubtful question [regarding] the respective powers of those who 
are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted if not 
put to rest by the practice of the government. An exposition of the 
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts ought not to be 
lightly disregarded. 
—Chief Justice John Marshall2 
INTRODUCTION 
Change undergirds many difficult questions in constitutional law. 
One persistent question is how the Constitution may change—through 
the formal amendment process, through social movements, or through 
judicial decisions.3 Another is whether, and when, changed 
circumstances should alter how the Constitution is interpreted.4  
 
 1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). 
 2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).  
 3. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011 (2012) 
(book review) (describing popular and social movements that precipitate constitutional change); 
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (same); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional 
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (describing sources of change other than 
constitutional amendments).  
 4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (posing the question of when a changing “understanding of the facts” merits 
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Still another question has begun to emerge recently—whether 
legislative change, meaning a federal statute’s novelty, speaks to 
whether that statute is constitutional. Three decades ago, the Supreme 
Court began to suggest that a federal statute’s novelty could be 
evidence that the statute exceeded the scope of Congress’s delegated 
powers or violated the Tenth Amendment. When the Court in New 
York v. United States5 held that Congress could not require state 
legislatures to enact federal directives, it observed that the challenged 
federal statute was different from other statutes: “The . . . [challenged] 
provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited 
which offers a state government no option other than that of 
implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”6 Five years later, 
Printz v. United States7 turned New York’s observation into an 
affirmative reason for why a federal statute purporting to require state 
executives to enforce federal law was unconstitutional.8 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia maintained that if “earlier Congresses avoided 
use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe 
that the power was thought not to exist.”9 
Since Printz, the Court has, on several occasions, trotted out the 
idea that legislative novelty signals that a statute is unconstitutional in 
cases regarding federalism and separation of powers.10 For example, 
when the Court held in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board11 that the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) removal structure violated the 
separation of powers, it maintained that “the most telling indication of 
the severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB is the lack of 
historical precedent for this entity.”12 And all of the opinions that 
concluded that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) minimum-coverage 
requirement exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce reasoned that the minimum-coverage requirement’s novelty 
 
constitutional change); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 5 (2010) (arguing that 
the Constitution’s meaning must change as time passes).  
 5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 6. Id. at 177. 
 7. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 8. Id. at 935.  
 9. Id. at 905. 
 10. Two years after Printz, Alden v. Maine relied on the same principle, without qualifying 
that the federal power must be highly attractive. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).  
 11. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 505. 
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was a strong indication that it was unconstitutional—what this Article 
calls antinovelty rhetoric.13 
The Court’s rhetoric about legislative novelty is related to a more 
familiar issue in constitutional law: how congressional practice factors 
into constitutional interpretation and, specifically, whether a statute is 
more likely to be constitutional because it is part of a longstanding 
history of similar congressional enactments. This idea is sometimes 
associated with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.14  
Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have since 
examined “the proper role of historical practice in” questions about 
“the distribution of authority between Congress and the executive 
branch.”15 Like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, Bradley and 
Morrison also addressed when a pattern of one branch’s acts can 
establish that branch’s legal authority.16  
Bradley and Morrison, as well as Chief Justice Marshall, were 
concerned with the inverse of the idea that legislative novelty signals 
that a statute is unconstitutional—when the existence of similar 
congressional statutes or executive actions suggests that there is 
constitutional authority to enact a certain statute or take an executive 
action.17 They did not address when congressional inaction may 
support the claim that Congress lacks constitutional authority.18  
The use of antinovelty rhetoric is now commonly employed by the 
federal courts. Every Justice on the Supreme Court has joined an 
 
 13. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012); id. at 2649 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).  
 14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); see, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1998) (linking 
McCulloch with the idea “that the Constitution allows the living legislature to govern”); Barry 
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.25 (1998) 
(same). 
 15. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 412, 413 (2012); see also id. at 416 (“[O]ur consideration of the role of 
historical practice is limited to the constitutional separation of powers, and in particular to issues 
of executive and legislative power.”). 
 16. Id. at 432. 
 17. Bradley and Morrison explained the relevant principle as follows: a longstanding pattern 
of one branch’s actions justifies that branch’s legal authority when “the other branch can be 
deemed to have ‘acquiesced’ in the practice over time.” Id. 
 18. Some of the reasons Bradley and Morrison give for why “it is precarious to infer 
congressional acquiescence” from “the absence of legislation prohibiting the executive action in 
question,” id. at 448, also speak to whether congressional silence or inaction may signify a 
constitutional infirmity, see id. at 440–43. For a similar discussion, see infra Part II.A.  
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opinion promoting the idea that legislative novelty is evidence of a 
constitutional defect, and this rhetoric has appeared in at least one 
majority opinion in each of the last six terms.19 In that same time, 
several panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,20 as 
well as panels on the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth21 and Sixth 
Circuits,22 have also relied on the idea that a statute’s novelty is 
evidence that the statute is unconstitutional, two doing so in the course 
of holding a federal statute unconstitutional.  
Still, there is a fair amount of uncertainty about how significant 
legislative novelty is to a court’s ultimate conclusion that a statute is 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, now is the time to critically assess and 
debunk the idea that legislative novelty is a sign that a statute violates 
constitutional principles of federalism or the separation of powers. This 
Article has three aims.23 First, it traces the evolution of the idea that 
legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional infirmity, defines its 
contours, and spells out its justifications. Second, it critically assesses 
the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. This Article maintains that legislative 
novelty is not evidence and should not be used as evidence that a 
statute is unconstitutional on federalism or separation-of-powers 
grounds. In those contexts, novelty should only be used to assure a 
judge that a ruling invalidating a federal statute (for reasons unrelated 
to the statute’s novelty) will not have disastrous practical 
consequences. Third, it compares the rhetoric about legislative novelty 
with the inverse idea that a longstanding pattern of congressional 
statutes is evidence of those statutes’ constitutionality. This Article 
does not reach a conclusion on whether that inverse principle is 
 
 19. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12; cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 
563 U.S. 247, 260 (2011) (“Novelty, however, is often the consequence of past constitutional 
doubts . . . .”). 
 20. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Seven-
Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221–
22 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Tatel, J., concurring); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 21. United States v. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d 232, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 22. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 556, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., 
concurring), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
 23. Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt maintain that NFIB “yielded an important 
constitutional innovation,” which they call the “antinovelty doctrine: a law without historical 
precedent is constitutionally suspect.” Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active 
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2139 (2015). 
But Katyal and Schmidt foreswear any kind of critical examination or assessment of the 
antinovelty doctrine, explaining that their “purpose is not to debunk the antinovelty doctrine on 
the merits.” Id. at 2149.  
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justified. But it shows that the reasons for rejecting the Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric do not require the inverse principle to be rejected, 
and there may be independently sufficient justifications for the inverse 
principle. 
Before proceeding further, one caveat is in order: this Article’s 
accounting of antinovelty rhetoric is limited to issues of constitutional 
federalism and the separation of powers, not individual rights. 
Antinovelty rhetoric has been invoked, albeit in a different form, in 
two cases concerning individual rights, Romer v. Evans24 and United 
States v. Windsor.25 Romer held unconstitutional a Colorado state 
amendment that repealed municipal legislation—and barred future 
municipal legislation—that extended nondiscrimination protections to 
persons based on their sexual orientation.26 Romer maintained that the 
amendment was “exceptional”27 and “unprecedented in our 
jurisprudence.”28 Romer then reasoned that “[t]he absence of 
precedent . . . is itself instructive” because “[d]iscriminations of an 
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to 
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision” 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.29 Windsor subsequently 
quoted this language when it held the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) unconstitutional.30  
There are, however, several differences between controversies 
regarding individual rights and controversies regarding constitutional 
structure that may be relevant to whether the Court’s antinovelty 
rhetoric is justified in the two contexts. First, part of this Article’s 
critique of antinovelty rhetoric in cases regarding constitutional 
structure depends on how Congress functions, which has less 
significance in cases involving individual rights because individual-
rights cases concern not only Congress, but also state and local 
governments. When a court invokes antinovelty rhetoric in cases 
 
 24. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 25. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 26. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36. 
 27. Id. at 632. 
 28. Id. at 633. 
 29. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). The 
Court in Romer then declared, “It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this 
sort.” Id. 
 30. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. For a countering view that DOMA’s regulation of marriage 
is not novel, see Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721 (1991). 
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involving federalism or the separation of powers, it will only search for 
similar congressional statutes. State statutes are not relevant because 
states are not subject to the constitutional federalism and separation-
of-powers limitations that apply to Congress. But the Bill of Rights and 
other individual-rights amendments are largely incorporated against 
the states. Therefore, when a court asks whether there are similar 
statutes—or a lack thereof—in cases involving individual rights, the 
court may survey statutes enacted by state governments and their 
instrumentalities. Because state and local legislatures are not subject 
to the same restrictions as Congress, several of the critiques of 
antinovelty rhetoric may not apply with as much force in cases 
involving individual rights. Second, there are potentially different 
justifications for antinovelty rhetoric in cases of individual rights, such 
as the potential for oppression of disfavored minorities,31 and these 
other justifications require separate treatment. Third, the relevant 
constitutional text and structure—which this Article uses to critique 
antinovelty rhetoric—treat constitutional federalism and the 
separation of powers differently than individual rights. Finally, in both 
doctrine and scholarship, practice-based arguments are treated 
differently in cases of individual rights versus cases of constitutional 
structure. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, cabined his statement in 
McCulloch to apply only where “the great principles of liberty are not 
concerned,”32 and Bradley and Morrison similarly walled off 
“individual rights controversies” from their analysis.33 These 
differences between the two kinds of cases “are sufficient . . . to focus 
exclusively” on one set of them—those involving questions of 
constitutional structure.34 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I identifies the Court’s 
increasing reliance on antinovelty rhetoric. Part II then examines the 
primary justification for the idea that legislative novelty is evidence of 
a constitutional defect, which turns on the mistaken assumption that 
Congress reliably exercises the full scope of its powers. Part III 
 
 31. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 416 (contending that federalism and 
separation-of-powers challenges “do[] not typically raise concerns about the oppression of 
minorities or other disadvantaged groups” that arise “in some individual rights areas”). 
 32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Romer—and also Windsor—
similarly defined the relevant principle as applicable to “[d]iscriminations of an unusual 
character.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Coleman, 277 U.S. at 37–38); Romer, 517 U.S. at 
633 (same). 
 33. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 416. 
 34. Id. at 417. 
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considers and rejects the idea that Congress’s inaction—through not 
enacting statutes—somehow makes a statute unconstitutional and the 
claim that legislative novelty should be used as evidence that a statute 
is unconstitutional. Part IV concludes that, at most, judges should 
consider a statute’s novelty to ensure that invalidating an otherwise 
unconstitutional federal statute would not call into question too many 
other federal statutes whose invalidation would require a dramatic 
restructuring of how government functions day to day.  
I.  LEGISLATIVE NOVELTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION  
Legislative novelty has factored into several recent controversies 
regarding constitutional structure. In the early 1990s, the Supreme 
Court observed that a federal statute purporting to require state 
legislatures to comply with federal directives was a fundamentally new 
form of legislation in the course of holding it unconstitutional. Since 
then, the Court has turned its observation about legislative novelty into 
a reason why a federal statute may violate constitutional principles of 
separation of powers or federalism. Part I.A describes the antinovelty 
rhetoric which has been used in several recent controversies. Part I.B 
explains the role that antinovelty has played in these rulings.  
A. Antinovelty Rhetoric in Constitutional Argument 
Several recent Supreme Court decisions have promoted the idea 
that legislative novelty is a mark against a law’s constitutionality. The 
idea began as something of an observation in New York, which 
addressed whether Congress could require state legislatures to regulate 
low-level radioactive waste according to federal directives.35 The Court 
concluded that Congress did not possess this authority.36 Recognizing 
that the Tenth Amendment did not speak to the precise question,37 the 
Court explained that “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that 
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,”38 
and maintained that requiring state legislatures to enact federal 
directives is inconsistent with several values that federalism 
 
 35. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992). The majority in New York 
included Justice O’Connor (the opinion’s author), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas.  
 36. Id. at 176–77. 
 37. Id. at 156–57 (“The Tenth Amendment[’s] . . . limit is not derived from the text of the 
Tenth Amendment . . . which . . . is essentially a tautology.”). 
 38. Id. at 166. 
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purportedly serves.39 But New York also noted the apparent novelty of 
the take title provision. It surmised that “[t]he take title provision is of 
a different character” from other kinds of federal regulations,40 and it 
observed that the “provision appears to be unique. No other federal 
statute has been cited which offers a state government no option other 
than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”41 
Five years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court held that 
Congress could not require state law enforcement officers to enforce 
federal law.42 Although New York had closed with an observation 
about the challenged statute’s novelty, the Court in Printz explicitly 
framed its analysis around the idea that legislative novelty signifies a 
constitutional infirmity. Again conceding that “no constitutional text 
sp[oke] to this precise question,”43 Justice Scalia framed the issue this 
way: 
The Government contends . . . that “the earliest Congresses enacted 
statutes that required the participation of state officials in  
the implementation of federal laws.” . . . [E]arly congressional 
enactments “provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the 
Constitution’s meaning.” Indeed, such “contemporaneous legislative 
exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of 
years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.” Conversely if, 
as petitioners contend, earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly 
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was 
thought not to exist.44 
 
 39. Id. at 168–69. 
 40. Id. at 174–75. 
 41. Id. at 177. Similar to New York, the Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. also observed 
that a statute was novel in the course of finding that statute unconstitutional. Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995). The Plaut Court also suggested the statute’s novelty was 
relevant to the constitutional analysis, but in less forceful terms than Printz and other cases later 
adopted: “Apart from the statute we review today, we know of no instance in which Congress has 
attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation. That 
prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference were not understood to be 
constitutionally proscribed.” Id. 
 42. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The majority in Printz included Justice 
Scalia (the opinion’s author), Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Thomas. 
 43. Id. at 905. 
 44. Id. (second alteration in original) (third omission in original) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Brief for the United States at 28, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503), 1996 WL 595005, at *28; then quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 748 U.S. 
714, 723–24 (1986); and then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)). This 
statement is also technically the inverse of the preceding one.  
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Moreover, after noting that early statutes imposed federal duties 
on state courts or state judges, but not state executives,45 the Court 
explained: “[T]he numerousness of these statutes, contrasted with the 
utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive 
(notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), 
suggests an assumed absence of such power.”46 Based on the “absence 
of executive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses” as well 
as the “absence of them in our later history as well, at least until very 
recent years,”47 the Court surmised, “The constitutional practice we 
have examined above tends to negate the existence of the 
congressional power asserted here.”48  
Shortly after Printz, the Court relied on legislative novelty in 
Alden v. Maine49 to justify the rule that Article I does not provide 
Congress with the power to subject unconsenting states to suits for 
damages in state court.50 Examining “early congressional practice,”51 it 
concluded that it had “discovered no instance in which [early 
Congresses] purported to authorize suits against nonconsenting States 
in” state court.52 Quoting Printz,53 the Court then surmised that “early 
Congresses did not believe they had the power to authorize private 
suits against the States in their own courts.”54  
New York, Alden, and Printz each contained antinovelty rhetoric 
that was used to identify federalism-based constraints about how 
Congress may regulate the states when Congress regulates in spheres 
that concededly fall within its Article I powers. The Court has 
subsequently invoked similar antinovelty rhetoric in cases that identify 
separation-of-powers constraints on how Congress may structure 
 
 45. Id. at 907. The Printz Court said that a late nineteenth-century statute did not state a 
command and that a draft statute was not coercive. Id. at 916–17. It offered some reasons for 
distinguishing between state judicial and executive officers. See id. at 907 (relying on the 
Supremacy Clause, Congress’s ability to not create federal courts, and the tradition of courts 
applying foreign law). For a critique of the Court’s reasoning, see Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State 
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 213–14. 
 46. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–08. 
 47. Id. at 916.  
 48. Id. at 918. 
 49. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). The majority in Alden was the same majority as in 
Printz. Justice Kennedy, rather than Justice Scalia, wrote that opinion. 
 50. Id. at 745. 
 51. Id. at 743. 
 52. Id.; see also id. at 744 (“[S]tatutes purporting to authorize private suits against 
nonconsenting States in state courts . . . are all but absent from our historical experience.”). 
 53. Id. at 744. 
 54. Id. 
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federal agencies. For example, Free Enterprise Fund examined the 
constitutionality of the PCAOB, which, by statute, consisted of five 
members removable only for cause by the SEC.55 Additionally, the 
SEC consisted of members who were removable only for cause by the 
President. The Court concluded that the PCAOB’s double layer of for-
cause removal protection violated “the Constitution’s separation of 
powers,”56 which requires the President to have some control over 
officers executing federal law.57 “Perhaps the most telling indication of 
the severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB,” the Court 
maintained, “is the lack of historical precedent for this entity.”58 The 
Court then stressed the PCAOB’s novelty throughout its analysis.59  
Two years later, the Court invoked Free Enterprise Fund’s 
antinovelty rhetoric in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB),60 the case in which five Justices stated that Congress 
lacked authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to require individuals to purchase health insurance.61 
The Chief Justice’s opinion, which stated that the minimum-coverage 
requirement exceeded Congress’s powers, began with the observation 
that “Congress ha[d] never attempted to rely on [its] power[s] to 
compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted 
product.”62 The opinion quoted Free Enterprise Fund’s antinovelty 
rhetoric,63 but it also framed antinovelty rhetoric in slightly softer 
terms, suggesting that “[a]t the very least, we should ‘pause to consider 
the implications of the Government’s arguments’ when confronted 
with such new conceptions of federal power.’”64 The joint dissent—
 
 55. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484, 486–87 (2010). 
The Free Enterprise Fund majority included Chief Justice Roberts (the opinion’s author), Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. 
 56. Id. at 492. 
 57. Id. at 492, 497–98. 
 58. Id. at 506. Free Enterprise Fund’s forceful account of antinovelty rhetoric directly quotes 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent to the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 59. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 514 (calling the double layer of protection a “new type 
of restriction”); id. at 496 (calling it a “novel structure”); id. at 505 (calling it “highly unusual”); 
id. at 505 (noting that “[t]he parties [had] identified only a handful of isolated positions” that 
might be similar). 
 60. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 61. Id. at 2591. 
 62. Id. at 2586. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)). 
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authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—agreed with 
the conclusion that the minimum-coverage requirement exceeded the 
scope of Congress’s powers.65 It similarly emphasized the minimum-
coverage requirement’s novelty,66 and at oral argument, Justice 
Kennedy explained the implications of the minimum-coverage 
requirement’s novelty: “Assume for the moment that this is 
unprecedented . . . . If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of 
justification?”67 
The Court has also relied on a statute’s apparent novelty to find 
that it unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s power to 
recognize foreign states. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry,68 while discussing the 
pertinent history, the Court observed, “‘[T]he most striking thing’ 
about the history of recognition ‘is what is absent from it: a situation 
like this one,’ where Congress has enacted a statute contrary to the 
President’s formal and considered statement concerning 
recognition.”69 Based in part on the lack of analogous congressional 
statutes, Zivotofsky inferred that Congress did not have the power to 
recognize foreign states and held that the statute was unconstitutional. 
Some antinovelty rhetoric has also appeared in cases that address 
the scope of executive power under Article II, independent of 
Congress enacting legislation that infringes on the President’s powers. 
Although these cases are related to Zivotofsky, they differ for purposes 
of this Article’s argument because they do not involve the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.70 For example, the Court relied on 
 
 65. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 2647, 2649 (describing the minimum-coverage requirement as “unprecedented” 
and explaining that “the relevant history is . . . that [Congress] has never before used the 
Commerce Clause to compel entry into commerce”). 
 67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,  
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2011/11-398-Tuesday.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW6U-J5E6]. 
 68. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). The statute directed the U.S. Department of 
State to identify “Israel” as an applicant’s birthplace on her passport when the applicant was born 
in Jerusalem and requested such identification. See id. at 2082. The Zivotofsky majority included 
Justice Kennedy (the opinion’s author), Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and 
Justice Kagan. 
 69. Id. at 2091 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(Tatel, J., concurring)). The Zivotofsky Court’s invocation of antinovelty rhetoric was borrowed 
from Judge Tatel’s concurrence to the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  
 70. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (finding that a presidential 
memorandum had no legal effect on states in part because it “is not supported by a ‘particularly 
longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence, but rather is what the United States itself 
has described as ‘unprecedented action’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
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executive novelty in NLRB v. Noel Canning71 when deciding that the 
President’s actions went beyond his “Power to fill up all Vacancies that 
may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”72  
The Court’s skepticism of legislative novelty also appears in cases 
that do not explicitly use the same kind of antinovelty rhetoric, as well 
as those that ultimately reject a constitutional challenge to a federal 
statute. One example of the former is Shelby County v. Holder,73 which 
invalidated a part of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).74 The Court 
repeatedly emphasized the novelty of the VRA provision it struck 
down, describing it as “extraordinary” no less than nine times.75 An 
example of a case where the statute’s constitutionality was ultimately 
upheld notwithstanding antinovelty rhetoric is Virginia Office for 
Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart (VOPA),76 where sovereign 
immunity was deemed to pose no bar to federal courts hearing suits for 
prospective injunctive relief brought by independent state agencies 
vested with federal rights.77 The VOPA Court quoted Free Enterprise 
Fund’s language that a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem . . . is [a] lack of historical precedent”78 and also noted that the 
“weightie[st] [constitutional] objection” to the suits was their “relative 
novelty.”79  
The federal courts of appeals have also latched onto the Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric, including in cases that invalidate federal 
statutes.80 The Fifth Circuit relied on legislative novelty when it held en 
 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); then quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 29–30, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566))).  
 71. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566–67. 
 73. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 74. Id. at 2631. For more information on the VRA and the Court’s decision, see infra notes 
159–63, 405–06. 
 75. Id. at 2618. 
 76. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011). 
 77. Id. at 260–61. 
 78. Id. at 270 (first alteration in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). 
 79. Id. at 260; see also id. (explaining that “[l]ack of historical precedent can indicate a 
constitutional infirmity” and that “[n]ovelty . . . is often the consequence of past constitutional 
doubts”).  
 80. Other cases address antinovelty rhetoric but uphold the federal statute. See, e.g., Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 556, 559 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “[l]egislative novelty typically is not a constitutional virtue” and that this fact 
“dignifie[d] the plaintiffs’ argument”); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The 
novelty . . . is not irrelevant. The Supreme Court occasionally has treated a particular legislative 
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banc that a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.81 
(The Supreme Court later reversed that decision in United States v. 
Kebodeaux,82 without saying anything about the statute’s novelty.83) 
The Fifth Circuit framed its analysis by saying that Printz had indicated 
that “a longstanding history of related federal action . . . expands the 
deference afforded to a statute. Conversely, the absence of an 
historical analog reduces that deference.”84 The D.C. Circuit also relied 
on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric in finding a provision of the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 
unconstitutional.85 The court maintained that “novelty . . . signal[s] 
unconstitutionality”86 and that the lack of an “antecedent” is a “reason 
to suspect” that a law is unconstitutional.87 (The Supreme Court 
vacated this decision on other grounds.88) Finally, and most recently, 
the D.C. Circuit relied on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric when 
holding a statutory provision establishing the structure of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to be 
unconstitutional.89 The opinion is littered with references to the 
statute’s purported novelty and how the statute’s novelty mattered to 
the court’s analysis and conclusion.90 
 
device’s lack of historical pedigree as evidence that the device may exceed Congress’s 
constitutional bounds.”). 
 81. United States v. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d, United 
States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). 
 82. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). 
 83. See id. at 2501. 
 84. Kebodeaux, 687 F.3d at 237–38. 
 85. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). 
 86. Id. at 673. 
 87. Id. 
 88. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015). 
 89. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). Indeed, the President 
may have more power over agencies headed by a single person, rather than a multimember 
commission. A President would only have to convince, fire, or replace one person in the former 
case, but he would have to convince, fire, or replace several people in the latter. 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“[N]o independent agency exercising substantial executive authority 
has ever been headed by a single person. Until now.”); id. at 8 (describing this structure as a “gross 
departure” and “never before” used); id. at 21 (noting that the CFPB is “exceptional” and 
“unprecedented”). 
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B. What Is Antinovelty Rhetoric? 
Reliance on legislative novelty is not a consistent theme in judicial 
decisions—far from it.91 The Supreme Court has upheld statutes that 
are novel without so much as mentioning the statutes’ novelty.92 And it 
has included antinovelty rhetoric in decisions upholding statutes 
without any explanation for why the statute’s novelty did not make the 
statute unconstitutional.93 Part I.A shows only that antinovelty rhetoric 
exists and that it has been invoked repeatedly in recent times. This Part 
tries to parse what exactly antinovelty rhetoric is by posing two 
questions. First, when do courts invoke antinovelty rhetoric? Second, 
what is the effect of the antinovelty rhetoric? Does it help resolve the 
cases in which it is invoked? Does it further other projects in 
constitutional law? Does it shape the outcomes in future cases?  
It is difficult to say when exactly legislative novelty affects the 
resolution of a question concerning principles of federalism or 
separation of powers, or even when the Court will employ antinovelty 
rhetoric. Legislative novelty might matter in a case if the Court adopts 
antinovelty rhetoric and determines that a federal statute is 
unconstitutional. These cases have often divided along ideological 
lines, at least in recent times (meaning that Justice Kennedy is in the 
majority with either the four more liberal Justices or the four more 
conservative Justices).94 They have also tended to be higher-profile 
 
 91. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“Our constitutional principles 
of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation.”). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2501 (2013) (reversing the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding that a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act exceeded 
Congress’s power without noting the statute’s novelty). The Chief Justice invoked the antinovelty 
principle in his dissent in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, which Justice Sotomayor also joined. Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissent 
maintained:  
There has never been anything like § 8772 before. Neither the majority nor respondents 
have identified another statute that changed the law for a pending case in an outcome-
determinative way and explicitly limited its effect to particular judicial proceedings. 
That fact alone is “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional 
problem” with the law. 
Id. at 1333 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 
(2010)). 
 93. In VOPA, for example, the Court explained that “the apparently novelty” of the suit did 
“not at all suggest its unconstitutionality” as opposed to the fact that the “conditions” for such a 
suit “rarely coincide.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260–61 (2011). 
 94. That describes NFIB, Free Enterprise Fund, and Zivotofsky, which were decided when 
Justice Scalia was still on the Court. Alden, Printz, and New York were similarly divided along 
ideological lines, but they were decided when Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist were 
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cases—for example, NFIB and Zivotofsky—rather than those where 
legislative novelty apparently did not matter—for example, when the 
Court invoked antinovelty rhetoric but held that the statute was 
constitutional (VOPA) or when the majority did not mention 
legislative novelty but the dissenters or the lower court did (Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson95 or Kebodeaux). But the cases where legislative 
novelty has “mattered” have not necessarily been high-profile cases to 
a general public audience (such as New York or Alden), even if they 
were significant federalism and separation-of-powers cases to the 
community of lawyers who care about such issues.  
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, moreover, implies that 
legislative novelty matters in its analysis.96 But it is unclear whether the 
Court uses novelty as a “factor” in its analysis or as an on–off switch 
that adjusts whether a statute is presumed constitutional or presumed 
unconstitutional. Sometimes legislative novelty appears to be a factor 
that is weighed together with other factors, such as the constitutional 
text or doctrine: a novelty score factors into the Court’s overall 
assessment of whether a law is constitutional or not.97 The Court in 
Alden, for example, used an analysis that appeared to be shaped by a 
combined assessment of text, structure, nonoriginalist and originalist 
history, and precedent. The Court conceded that “the sovereign 
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 
of the Eleventh Amendment,”98 but it maintained that the 
“Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative 
interpretations by this Court make clear” that states are immune from 
suits for damages.99 In other words, Alden suggested that these 
 
on the Court instead of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, and when Justice Souter and 
Justice Stevens were on the Court instead of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan. 
 95. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 96. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (“[T]he lack of 
historical precedent” is a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem.”). 
 97. Professor Richard Fallon has observed that different forms of argument cannot be 
weighed against one another because they are not commensurable. See generally Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1189 (1987) (considering how to weigh structure and doctrine when they point in different 
directions). Others have challenged whether “incommensurability” is a true impediment to 
reasoned constitutional decisionmaking. See Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional 
Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1999). 
 98. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1998). 
 99. Id. 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
1424  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1407 
arguments in combination generate a constitutional rule. Zivotofsky is 
similar to Alden in this respect.100  
But other times—including in these same cases101—legislative 
novelty appears to function more like an on–off switch that adjusts 
whether a statute is presumed constitutional (if the statute is not novel) 
or presumed unconstitutional (if it is). The entire analysis in Printz 
about whether federal commandeering of state executive officers was 
consistent with federalism was structured under the framework of 
antinovelty—if “earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive 
power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought 
not to exist.”102 The Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB was similar: the 
opinion deployed antinovelty rhetoric before proceeding to refute the 
government’s explanations for why the minimum-coverage 
requirement was constitutional.103 Professor Neal Katyal and Thomas 
Schmidt have argued that “the basic structure of the Chief Justice’s 
opinion” in NFIB reveals an especially high level of scrutiny of the 
government’s arguments for why the individual mandate was 
constitutional.104 The Chief Justice began his analysis by stating the 
Government’s theories for why the mandate was constitutional before 
refuting them, thus putting the “burden of establishing the 
constitutionality of the law” on the Government.105 Therefore, at a 
minimum, courts may be relying on antinovelty rhetoric to excuse 
themselves from the kind of reasoning or evidence of 
unconstitutionality one might expect in cases declaring federal statutes 
unconstitutional.  
But are courts deploying antinovelty rhetoric in service of a 
conclusion that they have already reached? That antinovelty rhetoric 
appears in ideologically divided, higher-profile cases arguably suggests 
that legislative novelty itself might not factor significantly in the 
resolution of cases. Courts may instead deploy antinovelty rhetoric in 
 
 100. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). 
 101. Alden also contained analysis that suggested novelty was more like an on–off switch. Like 
NFIB, Alden appears to have put the burden on the government to demonstrate that a particular 
statute was viewed as constitutional at the time the Constitution was ratified. Responding to the 
dissent’s argument that nothing in the historical materials addressed the validity of congressional 
statutes purporting to subject the states to suits for damages, the Court replied, “The dissent has 
provided no persuasive evidence that the founding generation regarded the States sovereign 
immunity as defeasible by federal statute.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 733. 
 102. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
 103. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
 104. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2141. 
 105. Id.  
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service of another project, and there are at least two theories that 
antinovelty rhetoric might further—originalism and antiprogressivism. 
Although it is difficult to identify one definition of originalism,106 
antinovelty may be related to originalism in that both ideas place a 
premium on the past, specifically what the Framers thought the 
Constitution meant. But the Court’s general antinovelty rhetoric is not 
a particularly good indicator of assumptions about the Constitution’s 
original meaning.107 Antinovelty rhetoric is also concerned with 
congressional practice during a period of time that extends well beyond 
the period during which the Constitution was drafted and ratified. 
What Congress did several decades after the Constitution was ratified 
is relevant to antinovelty rhetoric but less relevant to ascertaining the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Additionally, what Congress did by 
enacting statutes—that is, governing—may be qualitatively different 
than enacting the Constitution—that is, creating the government.  
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is probably more related to an 
agenda of scaling back the federal government’s authority. When the 
Court has used antinovelty rhetoric to invalidate a statute, it has 
frequently discounted recently enacted statutes as “not relevant,” 
instead focusing on whether the statute is similar to statutes enacted in 
the early 1800s.108 In addition, the challenge to the ACA’s minimum-
coverage requirement in NFIB looked, to some scholars, like a 
renewed challenge to the scope of federal legislative power—
specifically, one that sought to roll back the expansion of congressional 
power that occurred during the New Deal.109 Other scholars have 
observed a similar trend in recent administrative law cases—a 
libertarian-infused skepticism of federal administrative regulation that 
rejects the twentieth-century expansion of the administrative state.110 
 
 106. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1755 (2015) (describing originalism as 
“underdefined”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (“With the possible exception of ‘originalism,’ there 
is no word in constitutional law whose meaning means less than ‘activism.’”). 
 107. See infra Part II. 
 108. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“[T]hey are of such recent 
vintage that they are no more probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition.”).  
 109. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83–84 
(2012) (showing how arguments against the ACA “challenged th[e] basic constitutional 
consensus” of the post-New Deal framework). 
 110. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of 
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41–42 (“[T]he New Coke is a living-constitutionalist 
movement, a product of thoroughly contemporary values and fears—clearly prompted by 
continuing rejection, in some quarters, of the New Deal itself.”). 
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Here too antinovelty rhetoric is a way to challenge federal regulation 
because it raises questions about the proper authority of the 
administrative state, which expanded significantly in the 1930s.111 So 
antinovelty rhetoric might be a way to retreat from the kind of federal 
social and economic regulation that became common after the 1930s 
by only sanctioning already-enacted statutes and regulations. One 
defender of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, Professor Randy Barnett, 
has formulated it in these terms.112  
Not all of the Justices who have signed opinions with antinovelty 
rhetoric have wanted to roll back the expansion of federal power that 
occurred during the New Deal or make constitutional interpretation 
align more closely with the Constitution’s original meaning.113 
Knowing that antinovelty rhetoric might be a means to further those 
projects—particularly a challenge to much of federal social and 
economic regulation—may and should give them pause.  
Ultimately, however, whether one sees antinovelty rhetoric as an 
independent principle of constitutional interpretation or as a tool of 
another project in constitutional law is less relevant to this Article than 
the mere existence of antinovelty rhetoric. The Court’s repeated 
invocations of antinovelty rhetoric—coupled with its suggestion that 
legislative novelty matters—will continue to generate litigation and 
sometimes result in the invalidation of statutes, assuming the rhetoric 
is not rejected. A comparison of the briefs in Printz and NFIB is 
instructive: only one of the two principal opening briefs in Printz 
mentioned the statute’s purported novelty and it did so only once,114 
whereas the opening brief for the state respondents in NFIB used the 
word “unprecedented” twenty-one times.115 Recently, in PHH Corp. v. 
 
 111. See Mariano-Florentio Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1362 
(2014) (“[T]he federal bureaucracy had expanded considerably in the 1930s.”).  
 112. See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (And Why Did So 
Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1347–49 (2013). 
 113. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
167 & n.8 (2008) (citing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 7–8 (2005)). They may be joining 
opinions with the novelty language out of necessity to secure votes, they may not notice it, or they 
may not associate antinovelty rhetoric with these larger projects or the other cases in which it has 
been invoked. 
 114. Brief for Petitioner, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1478), 1996 WL 
464182 (no mention); Brief for Petitioner at 37, Mack v. United States, No. 95-1603, 1996 WL 
470962, at *37 (“Only in 1975 did an arm of the national government assert authority to command 
State officials to regulate interstate commerce.”). 
 115. Brief for Respondents, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 passim 
(2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400) (using the word “unprecedented” throughout).  
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,116 the D.C. Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, while adding its own variations, 
to find the statute establishing the structure of the CFPB 
unconstitutional.117  
II.  THE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGISLATIVE NOVELTY 
Part II analyzes whether legislative novelty should serve as 
evidence that a federal statute violates constitutional principles of 
federalism or separation of powers. It does so by unpacking and 
assessing the primary justification that has been offered for antinovelty 
rhetoric, which is that legislative novelty suggests that previous 
Congresses assumed similar legislation was unconstitutional.118 Some 
more recent cases, such as Free Enterprise Fund, have offered what 
may be a slightly different formulation. That formulation is examined 
Parts III.C. 
The idea that legislative novelty suggests that prior Congresses 
believed that similar legislation was unconstitutional is premised on the 
notion that if Congress possessed a particular power, it would have 
exercised it. The assumption that the legislature exercises the full scope 
of its powers is related to a conception of government that James 
Madison articulated in Federalist 51. According to Madison, the 
officials in each branch of government would aggressively exercise the 
full set of constitutional powers they possessed such that each branch 
would check the other—“[a]mbition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”119 Professor Daryl Levinson has illustrated how this account 
of government pervades both theory and doctrine regarding federalism 
 
 116. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g 
en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). 
 117. Id. at 6–8, 22–23. 
 118. See Alden v. Maine, 520 U.S. 706, 744 (1999). Some cases avoided identifying who thinks 
that a congressional power did not exist by framing the antinovelty principle in the passive voice. 
The Court in Printz, for example, said that “if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly 
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist,” but it 
does not identify who thought the power did not exist. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 
(1997) (emphasis added). And Printz and Alden reasoned that “the utter lack of [similar] 
statutes . . . ‘suggests an assumed absence of such power.’” Alden, 527 U.S. at 744 (quoting Printz, 
521 U.S. at 907–08). Plaut reasoned similarly. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
230 (1995). These cases, however, must be primarily talking about Congress’s beliefs. Alden made 
this clear: “It thus appears early Congresses did not believe they had the power to authorize 
private suits against the States in their own courts.” Alden, 520 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added). 
 119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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and the separation of powers.120 He has also shown how the 
assumptions underlying this account of government are seriously 
“flawed with respect to . . . Congress.”121  
Drawing from Levinson’s and others’ critiques, this Part explains 
why legislative novelty will rarely reflect prior Congresses’ assumption 
that a statute was unconstitutional. As Part II.A explains, enacting 
federal laws is difficult, and the nature of the legislative process 
requires Congress to select from among many different priorities and 
make compromises. Moreover, as Part II.B explains, congressional 
inaction and legislative novelty may arise for other reasons as well. 
Judicial decisions may make some legislative choices more attractive 
than others, different areas of federal regulation may be better suited 
to different forms of regulation, and new factual or legal developments 
may change reasonable people’s assessments about how to 
accommodate the pertinent constitutional values. Part II.C then rejects 
potential limitations on the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric that may 
promise to better identify those statutes that prior Congresses assumed 
were unconstitutional.  
Antinovelty rhetoric relies on legislative novelty to infer that 
Congress assumed that a statute was unconstitutional. But this 
inference is misguided. Each year, thousands of bills are introduced in 
the House and Senate, but only a small fraction pass.122 And for the last 
thirty years, Congress has passed between 1 and 7 percent of all bills 
introduced.123 In the 113th Congress, for example, there were over 
 
 120. Levinson states that, with respect to federalism, “[a]ll of the variations on the political 
safeguards argument . . . share the basic assumptions that the federal government, left to its own 
devices, will inexorably expand its power.” Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in 
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 940 (2005). And that account “finds a close analogy 
in the way courts and theorists think about the constitutional separation of powers.” Id. at 950. 
Further, “[c]ourts and theorists continue to embrace Madison’s understanding of competition 
among empire-building branches.” Id. 
 121. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 439; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 
2314, 2316 (2006) (“Publius’s view of separation of powers presumes three branches with 
equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet legislative abdication is the reigning modus 
operandi.”); Levinson, supra note 120, at 951–60 (critiquing the assumption with respect to 
separation of powers); id. at 942–43 (critiquing the assumption with respect to federalism). 
 122. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1321, 1341 (2001). 
 123. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/JX5F-36AR].  
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5,500 bills introduced in the House and over 3,000 in the Senate.124 Yet 
only eighty-six bills became law.125 It seems strange to assume that 
Congress had serious constitutional doubts about all of the bills that 
never became law (over five thousand). The same goes for the bills that 
were never even introduced—Congress probably did not assume that 
all of those bills were unconstitutional either. Yet the Court has shown 
no regard for whether Congress even considered a statute, much less 
whether it was constitutional. In Alden, for example, the Court held 
that Congress lacked the power to subject unconsenting states to suits 
for damages in state court, relying in part on historical materials that 
did not mention bills Congress had introduced that would have done 
exactly that.126 
A. Enacting Federal Laws Is Difficult 
Numerous institutional forces make enacting federal laws difficult 
and reduce Congress’s incentives and ability to innovate, including the 
Constitution’s requirements for Congress to make law, congressional 
procedures, and the nature of the legislative function.  
1. Constitutionally Prescribed Lawmaking Procedures.  The 
Constitution requires a set of cumbersome procedures to enact federal 
law.127 Article I, Section 7 requires that all federal legislation go 
through the process of bicameralism and presentment.128 To become 
law, a bill must pass both houses of Congress; be presented to the 
President for her approval; and, if vetoed, have the consent of two-
thirds of both the House and the Senate.  
Inherent to this process are three features, all of which make it 
hard to enact federal law. First, the Senate, the House, and the 
President are three different institutions. A majority of persons in any 
one of those institutions—potentially a minority of lawmakers—could 
 
 124. CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/search?q={%22congress%22:%22113%22,
%22chamber%22:%22House%22,%22type%22:%22bills%22}&pageSort=documentNumber: 
desc [https://perma.cc/86N2-HNT9] (House);  CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/search?
q={%22congress%22:%22113% 22,%22chamber%22:%22Senate%22,%22type%22:%22bills%
22}&pageSort=documentNumber:desc [https://perma.cc/Z8EV-RBNV] (Senate).   
 125. Public Laws, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/public-laws/113th-congress 
[https://perma.cc/AUN9-3TZR].  
 126. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999). 
 127. See John F. Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1863, 1868 (2004). 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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prohibit a bill from becoming a law.129 The process of “[b]icameralism 
and presentment . . . disclose[s] an unmistakable emphasis—to give 
minorities, in general . . . exceptional power to block legislation as a 
means of defense against self-interested majorities.”130 Second, the 
Senate, the House, and the President answer to different 
constituencies, further increasing the possibility that these institutions 
will disagree with one another with respect to any given federal law.131 
Third, both the Senate and the House are collective bodies composed 
of individuals. The Senate has 100 members, and the House has 435. 
The sheer size and diversity of the House and the Senate thus make 
coordinated action difficult.132 “Congress is a plural body” and “faces 
substantial collective action problems.”133  
The cumbersome nature of the lawmaking process was recognized 
by the men who drafted the Constitution.134 Madison described 
bicameralism and presentment as a “complicated check on legislation” 
that “may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial.”135 
Indeed, Madison objected to giving all states equal representation in 
the Senate precisely because it would enable “the minority [to] 
negative the will of the majority.”136 Hamilton too explained that 
 
 129. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74–75 
(2001) (“[B]icameralism effectively adopts a supermajority requirement.”); Michael B. 
Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 13 J.L. & POL. 
705, 712 (1997) (“It is well known that bicameralism functions like a supermajority 
requirement.”). 
 130. Manning, supra note 129, at 76; see also Clark, supra note 122, at 1340 (identifying Senate 
structure as a source of the supermajority requirement). 
 131. See U.S. CONST. art. I; see also William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: 
Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956 (“Given that members of the House and Senate represent different 
constituencies and given that these bodies must concur on a proposed law, a supermajority . . . is 
in effect required for much of the legislation approved by Congress.”). 
 132. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144 (1999) (“Congress is made up of hundreds of members . . . . Although all 
have a common stake in the institutional power of Congress, this is a collective good that, for well-
known reasons, can only weakly motivate their behavior.”). 
 133. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 440. 
 134. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 64–65 (1988) (“As Madison said in Federalist No. 10, the 
cumbersome process of legislation is the best safeguard against error.”).  
 135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 418 (James Madison) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison 
also said, “[A] senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from and dividing 
the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the 
security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies . . . .” Id. 
 136. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
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bicameralism and presentment “include[d] [the power] of preventing 
good [laws].”137  
2. Congressional Procedures.  Under Article I, Section 5, Congress 
also has the power to prescribe internal rules governing the lawmaking 
process.138 The rules that Congress has made add another set of 
encumbrances to the lawmaking process. A series of “veto gates”—
opportunities for a minority of legislators to veto legislation—make it 
more difficult to enact federal law.139 For example: 
In each house of Congress, a subcommittee and a full committee have 
“gatekeeping” rights in that a bill normally cannot be considered by 
the entire legislative body until it has been approved in committee. 
Then, legislation must be given a position on the legislative calendar 
and often must secure a special rule restricting debate or amendments 
(or both) from the Rules Committee . . . .140 
The committee process in particular means that a committee chair 
has the power to schedule hearings, votes, and markup sessions, such 
that “if the chair opposes the bill, believes more study is needed . . . or 
is pessimistic . . . that the bill has sufficient political support . . . the bill 
will die in committee.”141 “This is the fate of ninety percent of the bills 
introduced in each session of Congress.”142 Senators can also use 
filibusters or holds to block bills.143 “[A] maze of obstacles stands in the 
way of each congressional decision,” and “[e]very single veto point 
must be overcome if Congress is to act.”144  
 
 137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”). 
 139. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992); see Moe & Howell, supra note 132, at 146.  
 140. McNollgast, supra note 139, at 720–21; see also Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 64–65 
(“They must run the gamut of the process—and process is the essence of legislation.”); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2008) 
(discussing how complicated the federal legislative process is).  
 141. Eskridge, supra note 140, at 1444. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Moe & Howell, supra note 132, at 146. Professors Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. 
Weingast also explain:  
The Rules Committee in the House may refuse to grant a rule for a committee bill, 
thereby scuttling it. The Speaker may use his power to schedule legislation and to 
control debate in ways detrimental to the prospects of a committee bill. A small group 
of senators in the U.S. Senate may engage in filibuster and other forms of obstruction. 
Any individual senator may refuse unanimous consent to procedures that would 
expedite passage of a committee bill. In short, veto groups are pervasive in 
legislatures . . . . 
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3. The Legislative Function.  Various features inherent to the 
legislative process also make enacting federal laws difficult. First, 
legislatures have a finite amount of time and resources to address a vast 
number of subjects.145 Congress is not always in session, and when it is, 
it has a limited set of resources—committee staff, research services, 
political capital, and others—to invest in the many steps it takes for a 
bill to become law. “Often proposals with wide support fail . . . because 
the legislature [simply] lacks the time to enact them.”146 Some measures 
may “have a stronger claim on the limited time and energy of the 
[legislative] body.”147  
Second, beyond a lack of time and resources, there are many other 
reasons for legislators not to enact a law, including ordinary politics.148 
Legislators may believe that a “bill is sound in principle but politically 
inexpedient to be connected with.”149 Or legislators may believe that 
“action should be withheld until the problem can be attacked on a 
broader front.”150 Political science scholarship has identified reelection 
as a significant motivation for many members of Congress,151 and 
legislators motivated by reelection have incentives to follow the wishes 
of their constituents, “who are concerned more with specific policy 
outcomes [rather] than congressional power.”152  
Political scientists have offered other explanations for why 
regulatory legislation may fail to pass at any given time. As Professors 
Jody Freeman and David Spence explain, “Rational choice 
models . . . conceive of the legislative process as the product of 
pressure exerted by interest groups” who “may be able to use their 
advantages to kill or forestall regulatory legislation,” whereas 
“organization theorists conceive of the policy process as far more 
 
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 89 (1987). 
 145. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983) (explaining 
that “[t]he foremost of . . . checks” on a legislative body’s power “is time”). 
 146. Id. at 539. 
 147. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory 
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 190 (1989). 
 148. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 335–36 (2005). 
 149. Marshall, supra note 147, at 190. 
 150. Id. 
 151. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990) (“Although 
[members of Congress] are not single-minded seekers of reelection, reelection is their dominant 
goal.”). 
 152. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 442.  
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anarchic—the product of inertia, luck, and other forces.”153 Although 
any one of these theories cannot model congressional behavior all of 
the time, the theories probably explain Congress’s behavior at least 
some of the time. And they provide reasons why Congress sometimes 
may not enact a bill even if it does not assume that bill is 
unconstitutional.  
Third, the compromises that go into lawmaking may sometimes 
minimize the number and scope of federal laws that are enacted. 
Textualists have emphasized “behind-the-scenes legislative 
compromise[s]” that are part of lawmaking.154 Sometimes, the 
brokered compromise may be to not enact any federal law. Lawmakers 
make deals to support one piece of legislation at the expense  
of another: “Often proposals with wide support 
fail . . . because . . . agreed-on bills become pawns in larger 
struggles.”155 Other times, a compromise may affect the shape that a 
federal statute takes, which may result in a federal law that is more 
limited in scope than the Constitution permits.156 
*   *   * 
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric assumes that Congress will 
always seek to exercise the full scope of its constitutional powers. But 
that assumption does not properly consider how Congress is structured 
or how it actually works. Congress’s inaction is, at best, a weak proxy 
for Congress’s assumption that a federal statute is unconstitutional. As 
Justice Scalia wrote: 
[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw 
any conclusions regarding [congressional] intent from the failure to 
enact legislation. The “complicated check on legislation” erected by 
our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert 
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act 
 
 153. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
11–12 (2014). 
 154. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 33, 38 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 155. Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 539. 
 156. See Manning, supra note 129, at 77. Professor John Manning also stated: 
The minority’s power to veto legislation carries with it the lesser power to insist, as the 
price of assent, upon less than what the bill’s proponents ideally would desire—and, 
perhaps, less than what a reasonable person would view as a fully coherent approach 
to the mischief sought to be remedied. 
Id. 
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represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability 
to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the 
status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political 
cowardice.157 
B. Noncongressional Sources of Novelty 
The previous section described how legislative novelty sometimes 
results from reasons inherent to the federal legislative process. This 
section outlines noncongressional sources of novelty—additional 
 
 157. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia was criticizing the Court for concluding that Congress’s 
failure to amend a statute was evidence that Congress agreed with a Supreme Court decision 
interpreting that statute. If legislative inaction is a weak proxy for Congress’s assumptions about 
the meaning of the Constitution, legislative inaction should also be a weak proxy for Congress’s 
assumptions about the meaning of a statute. In both cases, many different reasons might explain 
legislative inaction. Three doctrines—the acquiescence doctrine, the reenactment doctrine, and 
the rejected-proposal doctrine—infer something about Congress’s assumptions regarding a 
statute from Congress’s inaction. Under the acquiescence doctrine, if “Congress is aware of an 
authoritative agency or judicial interpretation of a statute and does not amend the statute, the 
Court has sometimes presumed that Congress has ‘acquiesced’ in the interpretation’s 
correctness.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES 
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 854 (5th ed. 2014). 
Under the reenactment rule, “[i]f Congress reenacts a statute without making any material 
changes in its wording, the Court will often presume that Congress intends to incorporate 
authoritative agency and judicial interpretations of that language.” Id. And under the rejected-
proposal rule, “[i]f Congress (in conference committee) or one chamber (on the floor) considers 
and rejects specific statutory language, the Court has often been reluctant to interpret the statute 
along lines of the rejected language.” Id.; see, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Night, 543 
U.S. 50, 63 (2004) (drawing an “analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark’”); id. 
at 73 (calling it the “Canon of Canine Silence”). 
Whether these doctrines make too much of legislative inaction is beyond the scope of this 
Article; statutory interpretation may reasonably differ from constitutional interpretation. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 108–22 (1988) 
(discussing a defense of some iterations of these doctrines). The reenactment and rejected-
proposal rules may be different in that they draw an inference from legislative action (enacting a 
statute) that also happens to include some inaction (not amending language, either through 
responding to judicial or agency decisions or other representatives’ proposals), rather than an 
inference simply from inaction (not enacting a statute). Only the acquiescence rule makes 
something solely of legislative inaction. Perhaps for this reason, Justice Scalia was particularly 
critical of it while on the Court. See infra note 255; see also BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN 
SCALIA, READING LAW 326 (2012) (disavowing the acquiescence rule in cases of nonexistent 
legislative amendments, but agreeing that “statutes adopted after” certain kinds of “prior judicial 
or administrative interpretations” may acquiesce in those interpretations). But even with the 
acquiescence rule, there is some precipitating event that purportedly, and somewhat plausibly, 
generates Congress’s attention—namely, a sufficiently important judicial or agency interpretation 
of a congressional statute. That may not be the case for the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric because 
there may be no precipitating event that might plausibly catch Congress’s attention. 
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reasons why Congress may not enact statutes aside from thinking that 
those statutes are unconstitutional. 
1. Judicial Decisions.  Judicial interpretations of the Constitution 
may affect how Congress legislates. Given the amount of resources and 
time required to enact a federal statute, Congress may attempt to enact 
statutes that are likely to be upheld. Accordingly, judicial decisions—
specifically, what federal judges have said about what statutes might be 
unconstitutional—may incentivize Congress to avoid enacting federal 
statutes that test the limits of its constitutional powers.158  
Consider, for example, the legislative history of the 2006 
reauthorization of the VRA. Originally enacted in 1965, the VRA 
required nine states to preclear any changes to their voting laws.159 
Between 1965 and 2006, the VRA had been upheld on three 
occasions.160 Since those decisions, however, the Court announced a 
more rigorous form of scrutiny applicable to legislation that was 
enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.161 Congress, in deciding 
how to reauthorize the VRA, elected to stick with a version of the 
preclearance regime that had previously been upheld. Testimony in 
congressional hearings and congressional debates reflected the focus 
on reauthorizing a version of the VRA that would be upheld in court.162 
 
 158. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Court reasoned that Congress legislates in 
response to judicial decisions:  
To the extent recent practice . . . departs from longstanding tradition, it reflects not so 
much an understanding that the States have surrendered their immunity from suit in 
their own courts as the erroneous view, perhaps inspired by [the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in] Parden and Union Gas, that Congress may subject nonconsenting States 
to private suits in any forum.  
Id. at 745.  
 159. For a summary, see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1207, 1208–09 (2016). 
 160. Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 283–85 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 
U.S. 159, 178–83 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966).  
 161. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For an explanation of the intervening 
legal challenges to the VRA, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the 
Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 
(2005). 
 162. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues 
Relating to Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) 
(statement of Richard L. Hasen, Professor, Loyola Law School) (focusing on the necessity of 
passing a bill that “will . . . pass constitutional muster in the Supreme Court”). The first question 
that Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter asked Professor Richard Pildes to 
answer at length was, “Is there anything that Congress can do to ensure that the reauthorization 
of the Voting Rights Act is upheld by the Supreme Court under the ‘congruence and 
proportionality’ test articulated in City of Boerne v. Flores?” The Continuing Need for Section 5 
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As Professor Nathaniel Persily explained, “Even though the 
shortcomings . . . were widely recognized, tinkering with its basic 
architecture was . . . constitutionally risky. Better to stick with a law 
that the Court had previously upheld . . . rather than gamble on a 
regime without stare decisis.”163  
Commandeering may be another example of how statutes 
sometimes reflect Congress’s reticence to test judges’ interpretations 
of the Constitution, rather than reflecting Congress’s own assumptions 
about the Constitution. In Printz, the Court reasoned that Congress’s 
history of not requiring states to enforce federal laws signaled 
Congress’s assumption that it lacked the power to do so.164 But the lack 
of analogous statutes instead might have reflected Congress’s concern 
that the Court would invalidate a statute requiring states to enforce 
federal law. In an 1842 decision, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,165 the Court 
held that the Fugitive Slave Act was a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s powers under the Fugitive Slave Clause.166 Prigg, however, 
suggested the statute would have exceeded Congress’s powers if it had 
pressed state executives into implementing federal law: “The states 
cannot . . . be compelled to enforce” federal law, “and it might well be 
deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to insist that the states are 
bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national 
government.”167 During this time period, the Supreme Court also 
considered the possibility that Congress could not impress state judicial 
officers into service,168 but it rejected that idea in the early 1900s.169 The 
 
Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 105 (2006) (statement 
of Richard H. Pildes, Professor, New York University School of Law) (emphasis omitted); see 
H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 93 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 678 (focusing on the VRA’s 
constitutionality and noting that the VRA was previously upheld). 
 163. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act (VRA), 117 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 139, 140 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-promise-and-
pitfalls-of-the-new-voting-rights-act-vra [http://perma.cc/B7E3-FVZU]; see Nathaniel Persily, 
The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 211 (2007) (“Whatever 
its drawbacks, the current coverage formula had the virtue of already having been upheld by the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 164. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997). 
 165. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 166. Id. at 624.  
 167. Id. at 615–16. 
 168. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1046 
(1995); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 581–
84 (1925) (describing Supreme Court cases intimating that Congress could not impress state 
judicial officers into service). 
 169. Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912); Caminker, supra note 168, at 1023–
28. 
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Court’s suggestion that Congress could not commandeer state 
executive officers—a suggestion that went unchallenged in Supreme 
Court opinions for over a century—may partially explain the greater 
number of federal statutes commandeering state judges than state 
executive officers.  
The Reconstruction Amendments are another example of how 
judicial decisions may limit Congress’s incentives to test the limits of 
its constitutional powers, especially when there are other, judicially 
sanctioned means of pursuing Congress’s desired goal. In 1883, in The 
Civil Rights Cases,170 the Court held that the Reconstruction 
Amendments did not provide Congress with the power to prohibit 
racial discrimination in private establishments.171 Congress did not 
attempt to reenact any laws prohibiting racial discrimination by private 
entities for several decades,172 but when the civil rights movement 
gained traction in the 1960s, The Civil Rights Cases remained on the 
books. But in a series of 1940s decisions, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress could pass laws under its Commerce Clause authority 
regulating even purely intrastate commerce and that the Court would 
not inquire into Congress’s “motives” in enacting such legislation.173 
Relying on these decisions, the Supreme Court upheld congressional 
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination by private entities under 
the Commerce Clause.174 It would be strange to think that these cases 
did not affect the way in which federal antidiscrimination legislation 
was enacted. The doctrine has evolved in such a way that Congress has 
little incentive to challenge the proposition that it cannot prohibit 
racial discrimination by private entities under the Reconstruction 
Amendments, because it can enact such legislation under the 
Commerce Clause.  
2. Precipitating Changes.  Congress also enacts new statutes 
because of changing conditions that did not previously exist. Congress 
enacts laws in response to existing conditions, and Congress now 
regulates in more domains than it did one hundred or two hundred 
 
 170. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 171. Id. at 15, 25. 
 172. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 512–28 (1988) 
(describing how political moderates lost the will to police southern states). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114–15 (1941). 
 174. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(same). 
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years ago. Various facts about the world have changed, such as the 
interconnectedness of the economy and the formation of political 
parties, and the federal bureaucracy is now more substantial in size and 
authority. In light of these changes, the absence of a federal statute may 
reflect nothing more than Congress’s belief that a particular kind of law 
was not needed or even its members’ lack of imagination.  
a. New or Changed Facts.  One reason why Congress may not have 
previously enacted similar statutes is that new or changed facts have 
brought a new issue to Congress’s attention or changed the need for 
legislation. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority175 
addressed whether Congress may apply the federal minimum-wage 
requirement to state and local government employees.176 In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, when the Court decided Garcia, state and local 
government employees constituted around 12 to 13 percent of the 
civilian workforce.177 A century earlier, however, government 
employees—local, state, and federal—constituted less than 1 percent 
of the national workforce.178 Even in 1900, these government 
employees constituted only 4 percent of the national workforce, and in 
1930, state and local employees constituted less than 6 percent of the 
national workforce.179 As state and local employees became an 
increasingly significant portion of the workforce, federal employee 
regulation began to cover state and local employees. State and local 
employees were no longer “small pockets of isolated workers whose 
conditions d[id] not affect interstate commerce.”180  
 
 175. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  
 176. Id. at 554. 
 177. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, 
and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1733–34 (1990) (book review) (citing 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 293, 380 (109th ed. 1989) (noting there were 
13,913,000 state and local government workers among the 109,597,000 persons employed in the 
civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 and over).  
 178. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789–1945, at 64 ser. D. 47-61 (1949), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/
documents/HistoricalStatisticsoftheUnitedStates1789-1945.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WTZ-5NUN] 
(showing that there were 12,920,000 gainful workers in 1870, with all governmental employees 
amounting to only 100,000).  
 179. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION, pt. 5, at 137 ser. D 127-141 
(1975), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p1-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BK2P-T22S] (showing that nonagricultural governmental employees totaled 1,094,000 in 1900 
and 2,371,000 in 1920); id. at 128 ser. D 11-25, at 128 (showing that the civilian labor force totaled 
51,251,000 in 1900 and 87,981,000 in 1930).  
 180. Laycock, supra note 177, at 1733–34. 
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b. Changed Assessment of Facts.  Apart from whether the 
underlying facts have actually changed, Congress’s assessment of the 
facts may have changed. Take federal commandeering of state 
executive officers. The Court in Printz relied on the lack of historical 
evidence to conclude that Congress assumed it lacked the power to 
impress state officers into federal service. But “[v]arious Framers 
(including Hamilton) commented that the coercion of states would 
likely prove impractical or ineffective at best and dangerous because 
divisive at worst.”181 Hamilton, for example, worried that state 
administration of federal law “w[ould] in a great measure fail in the 
execution.”182 Decisionmakers two hundred years ago may not have 
required states to execute federal law because they did not believe the 
states could adequately execute it.  
c. New Areas for Regulation.  Some novel statutes may also arise 
because Congress controls more regulatory spheres today than it did 
one hundred or two hundred years ago. New industries have emerged, 
and some older industries were not always regulated at the federal 
level. To take just a few examples, nuclear weapons, the Internet, 
telephones, genetically modified food, and driverless cars (or even just 
cars) did not exist in the first fifty years of the United States. Before 
these technologies and their associated industries existed, Congress 
could not regulate them. Congress also now regulates in industries or 
domains that have long existed but have not always been regulated at 
the federal level. Before the 1900s, Congress did not regulate much 
intrastate economic activity under the Commerce Clause.183 But today 
Congress regulates home-grown drugs,184 small places of public 
 
 181. Caminker, supra note 168, at 1048; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 97 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot 
be executed without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect 
of their being executed at all.”); Madison, supra note 136, at 9 (“The practicability of making laws, 
with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”).  
 182. LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 33–34 (1966). 
 183. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 601–02 (2014) 
(discussing the direct–indirect distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 184. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
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accommodations,185 loan sharking,186 and insurance.187 Indeed, some 
maintain there is now no sphere of authority in which Congress may 
not reach under its commerce power or another one of its delegated 
powers.188 
Changed facts present a clear example of why antinovelty rhetoric 
should not apply when the novel legislation deals with a new area of 
regulation. If particular areas of regulation—the Internet, nuclear 
weapons, or certain pollutants—did not exist, then of course the fact 
that Congress did not regulate those areas before their existence 
should not mean that Congress lacks the power to regulate. Changed 
facts arguably pose less of an issue for the antinovelty principle in cases 
involving new forms of congressional legislation. New facts may not 
support the claim that Congress can now exercise its powers in ways it 
previously did not, even if new facts may support the claim that 
Congress can exercise its powers in previously unregulated areas. 
But changed facts cause Congress to exercise its powers in new 
ways, in part because new facts generate new areas of regulation, and 
new areas of regulation may require new forms of regulation. The 
industries and activities that Congress regulates today differ in 
important ways, so they present different regulatory issues than those 
that Congress faced in 1800. And new regulatory forms may not have 
been suited to the areas in which Congress previously regulated. For 
example, in the late 1700s and early 1800s, Congress regulated the 
production and consumption of salt189 and “snuff and refined sugar” 
through import duties.190 That may have been the best regulatory tool 
for salt and sugar, but the regulation of salt and sugar poses different 
issues than the regulation of driverless cars, telephones, loan sharking, 
and the provision of public accommodations.  
 
 185. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1964). 
 186. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
 187. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 542–45 (1944) (holding that 
Congress may regulate the insurance industry despite stating in prior cases that insurance was not 
interstate commerce), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1970). 
 188. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 318 (rev. ed. 2014); cf. Primus, supra note 183, at 579 (“[F]or much of the twentieth 
century, many people suspected that internal limits had lost all practical significance.”). 
 189. Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 43, 2 Stat. 60 (repealed 1807) (continuing “[a]n act laying an 
additional duty on Salt imported into the United States, and for other purposes”). 
 190. Act of Feb. 25, 1801, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 102 (repealed 1802) (continuing “the act laying certain 
duties on snuff and refined sugar”). 
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d. New Policy Goal.  Within any given area of regulation, there are 
potentially infinite policy goals to pursue, and different policies may 
call for different regulatory tools. That a regulation is new, therefore, 
may reflect that Congress has not elected to pursue a particular policy 
goal within an area in which it has long regulated. Take, for example, 
federal housing law, which addresses myriad regulatory goals. Some 
federal laws attempt to remedy unsafe housing conditions.191 Others try 
to expand the number of homes available to Native American 
families,192 and still others prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, or 
provision of housing related services.193 And Congress has elected to 
pursue these different goals using different means. For example, as part 
of an effort to reduce lead-based paint, Congress directed the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to incorporate the need to 
reduce lead-based paint hazards into underwriting, insurance, and 
mortgage appraisals.194 The program providing housing assistance for 
Native Americans, by contrast, requires consultation with Native 
American tribes before granting funds and approving plans created by 
eligible housing authorities.195 As part of its policy to ban housing 
discrimination, Congress funded an education initiative as well as 
private programs to investigate and test compliance with the law.196 As 
these examples indicate, different regulatory tools are appropriate for 
different policies. The mere fact that Congress has regulated a 
particular area, such as housing, does not mean that it has exhausted 
the full set of regulatory options available within that sphere. As 
Congress’s regulatory priorities and goals change, so too will its choice 
of regulatory tools. And given the sheer number of policies that it could 
conceivably pursue, Congress may not have tried out all forms of 
constitutionally permissible regulation. 
e. New Forms of Regulation.  New forms of congressional 
regulation may themselves result in additional kinds of statutory 
novelty. A new form of regulation may lead to a new kind of 
enforcement proceeding becoming available by statute. Consider 
federal regulation of state governments: federal regulations began to 
impose obligations on states as employers and created opportunities 
 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2012); id. § 1441b. 
 192. 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2012). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–06. 
 194. Id. § 4852a(c)(1), (c)(5). 
 195. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4112–13. 
 196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3616a(b)(2), (d). 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
1442  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1407 
for individuals to enforce federal statutory obligations against states. A 
new kind of federal regulation thus generated a different kind of 
federal enforcement proceeding: suits for damages for violations of 
federal law against the states. 
Cooperative-federalism programs, in which Congress works with 
states in some fashion, provide another example of how new kinds of 
federal regulations may generate new kinds of enforcement 
proceedings.197 Cooperative-federalism programs differ from one 
another in several ways. They impose myriad conditions on state and 
local governments for accepting federal funds, and they use a variety 
of incentives and mechanisms to encourage states to regulate in 
accordance with federal goals.198 The sheer variety of conditions in 
these programs generates many different possible federal enforcement 
mechanisms. The Court in VOPA acknowledged this when it held that 
an independent state agency vested with federal rights could sue other 
state officials for prospective injunctive relief. Dismissing the idea that 
the suit’s novelty indicated that the suit was not constitutionally 
permissible, the Court explained the requirements for such a suit to 
arise:  
[A] state agency needs two things: first, a federal right that it possesses 
against its parent state; and second, authority to sue other state 
officials to enforce that right . . . . These conditions will rarely 
coincide . . . . Thus, the apparent novelty of this sort of suit does not 
at all suggest its unconstitutionality.199 
New forms of regulation may also generate new kinds of ancillary 
regulations. Sometimes Congress enacts a regulatory scheme with 
mutually reinforcing provisions or provisions designed to address 
effects caused by other statutory provisions. In United States v. 
Comstock,200 for example, the Court explained that federal criminal 
prohibitions may generate other, ancillary regulations, including 
establishing federal prisons and regulating those prisons to ensure “the 
 
 197. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in 
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 584–88 (2011) (describing different variations on 
cooperative-federalism programs). 
 198. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense 
of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 259 (2014) (explaining federal grant conditions and 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance). 
 199. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260–61 (2011). 
 200. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
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safety of the prisoners, prison workers and visitors, and those in 
surrounding communities.”201  
f. Changed Accommodation of Constitutional Values.  Novelty 
may also be the result of Congress’s changed assessment of the relevant 
constitutional values. Congress may accommodate constitutional 
values like state autonomy in different ways.202 Congress may promote 
state autonomy by not legislating at all: if Congress does not enact 
federal law, the states can make policy and realize the goals of state 
autonomy, such as better-informed local decisionmakers, regulatory 
diversity, and opportunity for local political engagement.203 But 
Congress may also preserve state autonomy by allowing states to 
implement federal law, by partnering federal agencies with state 
counterparts to administer federal law, or by offering states money to 
achieve regulatory goals.204  
Relatedly, the contours of state autonomy and the separation of 
powers are susceptible to change because there are competing 
constitutional values for Congress to reconcile with state autonomy 
and the separation of powers. State autonomy is one constitutional 
value, but so is national supremacy.205 Similarly, the separation of 
powers is one constitutional value, but so is the idea of checks and 
balances among the different branches of government.206 Congress 
may, therefore, strike the balance between these cross-cutting values 
in different places at different points in time. When it has struck the 
balance at any particular point in the past thus may not reveal every 
possible permissible balancing of those constitutional values.  
Finally, new or changed features of government may also offer 
new ways of realizing constitutional values. For example, the advent of 
political parties has provided a new vehicle for realizing state 
 
 201. Id. at 136–37, 142. 
 202. See generally Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional 
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733 (2005) (explaining 
how judges could compensate for anti-federalist developments by developing pro-federalist 
doctrines). 
 203. See Primus, supra note 183, at 587–91 (explaining this argument). 
 204. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-
Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751–52 (2013). 
 205. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2055 (2009). 
 206. Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1352–53 (2015); 
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
1971–77 (2011). 
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autonomy as well as the separation of powers. “Today’s polarized 
parties furnish” an additional means for how and “why states would 
check the federal government.”207 And although the advent of political 
parties may have eliminated some means for realizing the separation 
of powers, it has offered other ways of doing so.208  
g. Lawmaking Processes.  The participants in the lawmaking 
process have also changed. Congress is accountable to more groups 
today than it was 150 or 200 years ago—the electorate now includes 
different age groups,209 women,210 African Americans,211 and other 
groups who did not previously vote in federal elections. Congress also 
now enacts statutes to regulate alongside administrative agencies that 
exercise delegated lawmaking authority from Congress.212 There are 
also increasingly polarized political parties.213 “[U]northodox drafters 
outside of government” may generate new ideas for federal laws.214 
New participants in the lawmaking process may also provide new 
possibilities for whom Congress may select to implement federal law, 
leading to new kinds or forms of regulation as new entities are charged 
with implementing federal law. 
Another aspect of the lawmaking process that has changed is the 
ways in which laws are made. It was initially expected that the Senate 
would spend significant amounts of time in recess and that Congress 
might not meet every year.215 The first ten Senate sessions lasted 
approximately seven or eight months.216 It was not until the late 1880s 
 
 207. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090 (2014). 
 208. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006). 
 209. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.  
 210. Id. amend. XIX. 
 211. Id. amend. XV.  
 212. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
369, 369 (1989).  
 213. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 386 (1997).  
 214. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1823 (2015); see generally Christopher J. 
Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing agencies’ 
role in the legislative process). 
 215. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. 
Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (“The Congress shall assemble 
at least once in every year . . . .”), with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 7 
(requiring no period of adjournment be longer than six months).  
 216. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, 113TH CONG., 2013–2014 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY 524 (Comm. Print 2013).  
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that Congress had a session that exceeded three hundred days.217 The 
Senate’s “first serious controvers[y] over ‘obstructive’ uses of 
debate”—precursors to the filibuster—“occurred . . . [in] the 1820s.”218 
The Senate did not “establish a right of unlimited debate until 1856,”219 
and Congress did not develop a system of committees specialized in 
subject matter until the mid-1800s. Before that, there were two 
Committees of the Whole.220 
In part because of political polarization, the lawmaking process—
at least when it results in the enactment of federal laws—has begun to 
move away from the labyrinth of committees that were once thought 
of as hallmarks of the legislative process. “[I]n the first year of the 112th 
Congress, fewer than 10% of enacted laws proceeded through the 
‘textbook’ legislative process.”221 Indeed, the lawmaking process has 
changed so much that some scholars have observed “that the 
Schoolhouse Rock! cartoon version of the conventional legislative 
process is dead.”222 For example, “legislative bundling through 
omnibus vehicles has increased dramatically . . . omnibus packages 
have made up about 12% of major legislation.”223  
The recent uptick in political polarization, coupled with these new 
lawmaking procedures, has generated new forms of legislation. 
Political polarization sometimes means that parties are unable to come 
to any agreement and enact federal law.224 But political polarization 
also results in different kinds of laws than ones that were produced in 
less polarized times. “In the rare political moments where Congress 
produces legislation, the legislation tends to be sprawling and, at least 
according to some, ill-conceived or even ‘incoherent’—a trend toward 
what one recent article calls ‘hyper-legislation.’”225 Different kinds of 
agency authority may be appealing to Congress in times of gridlock, 
such as “administrative forbearance authority—by which Congress 
 
 217. Id. at 528.  
 218. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 189–90 
(1997). 
 219. Id. at 190. 
 220. Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative 
Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 327–28 (1994). 
 221. Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 214, at 1800.  
 222. Id. at 1794. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (1997) 
(arguing that the conventional model no longer adequately captures the legislative process).  
 223. Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 214, at 1800 (emphasis omitted).  
 224. See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 153, at 15–16. 
 225. Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1557 (2016). 
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grants agencies the express power to deprive the laws it passes of legal 
force and effect.”226 Polarization may also lead Congress to make new 
or additional delegations to states: “Particularly in times of divided 
government, some members of Congress might trust their home-state 
counterparts more than the administrative appointees of the President 
to fill in the interstices of new federal programs.”227  
h. Areas Versus Means?  Perhaps antinovelty rhetoric is more 
appealing when invoked in cases addressing new forms of regulation, 
rather than new areas of regulation. It may seem obvious to infer that 
if new facts develop, then Congress’s failure to regulate in that area 
does not and should not mean that Congress lacks the constitutional 
authority to regulate. Similarly, perhaps new facts do not support the 
claim that Congress can now exercise its powers in new ways. Even 
then, the other reasons why lack of constitutional authority does not 
follow from Congress not enacting a statute may also suggest that 
Congress’s failure to enact a statute does not reflect its assumption that 
it lacks the constitutional power to enact that kind of regulation. 
Bicameralism and presentment, together with Congress’s own rules 
about its procedures, make enacting federal law difficult and increase 
Congress’s incentive to enact minimal, low-risk statutes that do not risk 
other lawmakers’ opposition, such as enacting statutes that resemble 
prior statutes. Enacting federal statutes that use the same form or 
means of regulation is a way of trying to ensure that those statutes are 
upheld by judges.  
There are other reasons why it is unlikely that Congress has 
enacted all of the constitutionally permissible forms of regulation. A 
new policy goal may call for a new form of regulation, and because 
there are so many potential policy goals for Congress to pursue in a 
given area, Congress may exercise its power within a given area in a 
new way. Moreover, within any given regulatory sphere there are 
myriad forms that federal regulation could take,228 and when Congress 
chooses to address a particular issue, Congress will not enact every 
possible law it could have enacted to address that issue. If, for example, 
Congress wants to decrease the number of firearms near schools, it may 
 
 226. Id. at 1558. 
 227. Abbe R. Gluck, supra note 197, at 573. 
 228. In the constitutional convention itself, for example, one delegate explained: “We all 
agree in the necessity of new regulations; but we differ widely in our opinions of what are the 
safest and most effectual.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 161 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911).  
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choose to enact criminal penalties for possessing a firearm near a 
school. Additional ways it could accomplish this same goal would be to 
offer money to the states to enact criminal penalties for possessing 
firearms near schools, tax those who possess firearms near schools, 
delegate rulemaking authority to an agency to determine whether to 
prohibit firearms near schools, or conditionally preempt state firearms 
laws if the states did not enact criminal penalties for possessing 
firearms near schools. But Congress usually does not throw every 
possible regulatory solution at a problem, and therefore does not enact 
many constitutionally permissible means of regulation.  
Moreover, it is not always clear when a statute presents a new form 
of regulation as opposed to a new area of regulation. Consider the 
example of NFIB. Perhaps NFIB involved a new form of regulation—
requiring individuals to purchase a particular item. But NFIB could 
equally be thought of as involving a new area of regulation—the 
regulation of individuals not engaged in any commerce—splicing the 
antinovelty principle. Indeed, parts of the opinion invalidating the 
minimum-coverage requirement appear to reflect this 
understanding.229 The same could be said of Zivotofsky, which 
invalidated a statute on the ground that it infringed the President’s 
recognition power.230 Did that statute intrude on an area of regulation 
reserved to the executive—the recognition of foreign states—or was 
the statute particularly suspect because of its form of regulation?  
Finally, the premise that new facts do not lead to new forms of 
regulation is wrong. Sometimes changed facts themselves generate a 
new form of regulation. Take the emergence of state and local 
governments as significant employers in the national workforce. 
Historically, federal regulation of the workforce did not require the 
direct imposition of obligations on state governments or generate suits 
to enforce federal obligations against states. But the emergence of new 
facts—the expansion of state and local government workforces—
generated those new forms of federal regulation. And even if new facts 
only led to new industries and new areas of regulation, new areas of 
regulation may cause new forms of regulation because the kinds of 
 
 229. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–87 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (“The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial 
activity to be regulated. . . . The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing 
commercial activity.”); id. at 2644 (“If this provision ‘regulates’ anything, it is the failure to 
maintain minimum essential coverage. . . . [T]hat failure—that abstention from commerce—is not 
‘Commerce.’”). 
 230. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
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regulation Congress used to regulate other areas may not be well suited 
to address whatever risks or problems a newer area poses. 
C. Possible Refinements: Actual Constitutional Consensus or 
Attractive Constitutional Powers? 
Parts II.A and II.B outlined reasons why legislative novelty is a 
poor proxy for Congress’s assumption that it lacks the constitutional 
power to enact a particular statute. Instead of maintaining that all 
novel statutes are constitutionally suspect, another possible approach 
could be for the Court to limit the use of antinovelty rhetoric to cases 
involving statutes that prior Congresses doubted they could enact. But 
adoption of this approach would have far-reaching practical 
consequences, may not identify the Constitution’s original meaning, 
and would likely prove inadministrable. Alternatively, the Court could 
potentially use Printz’s formulation, which suggested that legislative 
novelty is evidence of Congress’s assumption that a statute is 
unconstitutional when the statute exercises “highly attractive” powers. 
But adoption of this formulation would similarly prove 
inadministrable. 
1. Actual Constitutional Consensus.  What if the Court only used 
antinovelty rhetoric in cases involving statutes that prior Congresses 
did not enact because they harbored doubts about the statutes’ 
constitutionality? Justice Scalia arguably embraced this kind of 
antinovelty principle in his dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission.231 The Justice framed the question as whether “the 
government conduct at issue was not engaged in at the time of 
adoption, and [whether] there [was] ample evidence that the reason it 
was not engaged in [was] that it was thought to violate the 
[Constitution].”232 This approach to antinovelty supports the 
implementation of an original understanding of the Constitution. But 
if the Court relies on later Congresses’ views about a statute’s 
constitutionality—in particular, Congresses in session after the first 
twenty or fifty years of the United States, as the cases often do—then 
it is no longer clearly about original understandings so much as the 
 
 231. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
 232. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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understanding during the nation’s first quarter to half century.233 This 
subsection rejects an antinovelty principle that would call into question 
all federal statutes that prior Congresses assumed were 
unconstitutional. That principle would be too dissonant with much of 
constitutional law; would likely reveal only the expected applications 
of the text, as opposed to its meaning; and would likely prove 
inadministrable.  
First, an approach to the antinovelty principle that calls into 
question the constitutionality of all statutes that the first twenty or so 
Congresses assumed were unconstitutional would have too far-
reaching consequences on much of constitutional law and 
constitutional practice. Several constitutional rules are considered 
settled by virtue of doctrine or congressional practice,234 including the 
government’s ability to distribute paper money235 and to provide Social 
Security.236 If constitutional disputes were to be resolved according to 
the Constitution’s original meaning, there would also be questions 
about various settled rules involving individual rights, such as the 
prohibition on segregation in public schools,237 the prohibition on the 
establishment of state churches,238 and the protections of free speech 
that extend beyond a prohibition on prior restraints.239 As a matter of 
original or historical understandings, these constitutional rules are 
hard to justify, so the antinovelty principle would jeopardize rule-of-
law values, such as predictability and stability, as well as undermine the 
 
 233. Unless the original understanding was to delegate a decision to a subsequent Congress. 
See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527–39 
(2003) (explaining the concept of liquidation).  
 234. Primus, supra note 113, at 177 & n.49 (“Many doctrines that are central to modern 
constitutional law are not reconcilable with original constitutional meanings.”). 
 235. Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 374, 389 (1982). 
 236. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 733–34 (1988); see Fallon, supra note 106, at 1810 (“Full-blooded exclusive originalism 
would be a nutty view.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 3, at 2027–30 (explaining that public-school segregation would 
be constitutional under a “consistent and honest application of expected-application 
originalism”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response 
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995) (“[T]he overwhelming consensus 
among legal academics has been that Brown cannot be defended on originalist grounds.”).  
 238. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the 
Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). 
 239. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 124–25 (1997); Leonard W. Levy, 
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 173 (1960); Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 835; Dorf, supra note 3, at 2027–30. 
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substantive justice that the constitutional system delivers.240 A system 
of adjudication in which judges discarded a significant amount of 
doctrine and congressional practice may also be too far removed from 
our own to be a viable interpretive approach to constitutional law.241 
Second, the antinovelty principle may only reveal prior 
Congresses’ expectations about how the text would be applied, which 
most contemporary proponents of originalism reject as the lodestar for 
constitutional decisionmaking. Recent scholarship on originalism has 
sought to refocus originalism away from the original intent of the 
Constitution’s drafters (the expected applications of the constitutional 
text) to whatever principle is embodied in the Constitution’s text (the 
original public or semantic meaning of the constitutional text).242 An 
account of antinovelty that focuses on whether “the government 
conduct . . . was thought to violate . . . the [C]onstitution”243 may reveal 
only the expected applications of the text, as opposed to its fixed 
meaning. Consider the cases that identify constraints on Congress’s 
powers based on the structure of the Constitution or the principle of 
federalism it embodies. The idea that Congress may not commandeer 
state officials is probably an expected application of some piece of 
 
 240. Professor Michael Dorf has explained how undoing these decisions may undermine 
individuals’ abilities to identify subjectively with the constitutional scheme. See Dorf, supra note 
3, at 2030 (“Although sacrificing Sullivan and Brown would not have immediate tangible legal 
consequences, these and other cases have come to stand for more than the legal doctrines they 
announced. They symbolize the association in the public imagination of the Constitution with 
core ideals of liberty and equality.”). 
 241. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case 
of Original Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1791–92 (1997) (explaining that a theory of constitutional 
law that “depart[s] so far from what the relevant audience understands that subject to 
be . . . cannot meaningfully be called theories of constitutional law”). Philip Bobbitt maintains 
that constitutional arguments and theory should conform—in some general way—to how 
constitutional law is practiced because lawyers’ reliance on the different modalities of 
constitutional argument is what makes the arguments legitimate. PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 170–86 (1982). But Bobbitt’s explanation for why that should be the case 
is not the only one. “It is one thing to argue that a practice is slightly askew, such that getting it 
right requires certain reforms. But it is quite another to argue that an entire community of 
practitioners is radically mistaken about the nature of its enterprise.” Primus, supra note 113, at 
178. 
 242. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2020 (describing new originalists as “reject[ing] original intent 
in favor of original meaning”). But there is substantial variety even among new originalists. See 
id. at 2019 (“The simple dichotomy between old originalism and new originalism does not begin 
to capture the many variations of originalism now on offer.”). There are also different kinds of 
“meaning” other than original or semantic meaning. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of 
Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1235, 1290 (2015) (identifying other kinds of meaning). 
 243. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 372 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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constitutional text—for instance, the Tenth Amendment or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause—or the Constitution’s general structure. 
It cannot be the core semantic meaning of those provisions, which say 
nothing about the specific question (in the case of the Tenth 
Amendment) or nothing at all (in the case of the Constitution’s 
structure).  
There are also reasons why it is difficult to divine the meaning of 
the text from Congress’s expectations or assumptions about how the 
text should be applied. An account of antinovelty that focuses on 
whether “the government conduct . . . was thought to violate . . . the 
[C]onstitution” may risk conflating the text’s semantic meaning with its 
expected applications because attempting to disaggregate the two can 
prove difficult.244 This difficulty is only exacerbated when there is 
arguably no provision of the text, or very little text, that is relevant to 
whatever question the judge is deciding, which is often the case for 
questions of federalism or the separation of powers.245 And there may 
be no epistemic reason why aggregating Congress’s expectations about 
how the text should be applied would reveal the public meaning of the 
text. Because Congress is a collective body, it may not be possible to 
attribute a singular constitutional view to its members. Even when a 
majority of Congress chooses not to enact a statute because they 
assume that the statute would be unconstitutional, those members may 
have different reasons for why that is. Different Justices of the 
Supreme Court articulate different reasons for reaching the same 
result.246 There is little reason to think that members of Congress are 
meaningfully different in this respect.  
Third, operationalizing a principle concerned with identifying 
congressional consensus that a statute is unconstitutional would likely 
prove inadministrable. It is not always clear what constitutional 
decisionmakers, particularly members of Congress, mean when they 
 
 244. Dorf, supra note 3, at 2031–34 (explaining how the two can be grouped together even by 
original-public-meaning originalists).  
 245. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 98, 101 (2009). 
 246. Compare, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010) (explaining that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposing life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide 
offenses), with id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (contending that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits imposing life without parole on the particular juvenile); compare E. Enters. v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 498, 522–23 (1998) (finding that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act effected 
an unconstitutional taking), with id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that the Act violated 
due process but did not amount to a taking). 
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express the belief that a statute is unconstitutional.247 Thus, even a 
highly idealized congressional record that contains statements 
regarding a statute’s constitutionality will be an imperfect proxy for 
either the public meaning of the text or its expected applications. Some 
constitutional arguments will be opportunistic—the reasoning will 
mask political claims in the language of constitutional reasoning. Even 
good-faith constitutional arguments may reflect what Professor 
Richard Primus has called “constitutional expectations”—expectations 
about how the constitutional system should operate, rather than a 
judgment about the requirements of the constitutional text.248 That is, 
rather than revealing Congress’s understanding about the 
requirements of the constitutional text, some constitutional claims may 
instead reflect how participants in the system expected things to work, 
given the underlying conditions at the time as well as their common 
experiences and socialization. And extrapolating what members of 
earlier Congresses thought in light of current conditions, experience, 
and socialization is, essentially, asking how individuals would resolve 
the matter in those moments.249  
2. Attractive Powers.  Writing for the majority in Printz, Justice 
Scalia maintained that if “earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly 
attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was 
thought not to exist.”250 No case after Printz even included this possible 
limit on the Court’s approach to legislative novelty. But what if the 
Court stuck with this approach and inferred that the absence of similar 
statutes reflected Congress’s assumption that a statute was 
unconstitutional only if that statute exercised “highly attractive” 
powers—that is, powers Congress would have wanted to exercise?  
The problem with an “attractive powers” limit may be in its 
administration. The Supreme Court’s own application of this version 
of antinovelty rhetoric provides reason to be skeptical of judges’ 
abilities to discern when a statute was “highly attractive” to 
 
 247. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1104–28 
(2013) (suggesting that a label of constitutionality traffics in different ideas). 
 248. See id. at 1107 (“[O]ur constitutional expectations have the power to divert our attention 
from the words in the text.”).  
 249. Klarman, supra note 213, at 395–96 (explaining that those who try to “translate” 
constitutional texts to modern times “adjust the Framers’ constitutional commitments to reflect 
changed circumstances, but fail to ask whether the Framers would have remained committed to 
the same concepts had they been aware of future circumstances”). 
 250. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
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contemporary Congresses and when Congress has not enacted a statute 
because it assumed that the statute was unconstitutional. In Printz, 
Justice Scalia reasoned that “the utter lack of statutes imposing 
obligations on the states’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness 
of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such 
power.”251 But the idea that impressing state officers into service was 
“attractive” to Congress is doubtful if not plainly wrong—proponents 
of federal power did not want to rely on state officers to enforce federal 
law in part because of concerns about the state officers’ competence. 
Moreover, there are still too many reasons why Congress might not 
enact laws exercising “attractive” powers to infer that Congress 
assumed such statutes were unconstitutional. 
*   *   * 
This Part has focused on debunking the first step in the Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric—namely, the claim that legislative novelty 
suggests that prior Congresses believed that a statute was 
unconstitutional. But the antinovelty rhetoric includes another 
questionable assumption: that prior Congresses’ assumptions about a 
statute’s constitutionality do or should affect whether a statute is 
unconstitutional. The Court has never explained why prior Congresses’ 
assumptions matter to whether a statute is unconstitutional. 
Antinovelty rhetoric might also be rejected on the basis of an 
explanation about why Congresses’ assumptions about a statute’s 
constitutionality purportedly matter to a statute’s ultimate 
constitutionality. For example, one might argue that a prior Congress’s 
assumption that a statute is unconstitutional means that the statute is 
unconstitutional because, if Congress assumes something to be true, 
then it is true. That does not seem right, however, because Congress 
makes mistakes. It makes drafting errors,252 and it enacts statutes that 
are plainly inconsistent with current doctrine253 or the original meaning 
of the Constitution’s text.254  
Perhaps Congress’s belief that a statute is unconstitutional is some 
evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. But either way, these 
 
 251. Id. at 907–08 (first emphasis added). 
 252. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265 
(2003) (citing examples of likely scrivener’s errors). 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (invalidating a statute that 
criminalized certain depictions of animal cruelty). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 231–41.  
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formulations are arguably inconsistent with some Justices’ refusal to 
consider Congress’s assumptions in statutory interpretation cases. 
These Justices maintain that Congress’s purpose is not relevant to the 
meaning of a statute, and yet antinovelty rhetoric maintains that 
Congress’s assumptions about the meaning of the constitutional text 
are in fact relevant to the meaning of that text.255  
III.  ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONALITY, VIEWS OF BRANCHES, AND 
CONDUCT OF BRANCHES: A NEW JUSTIFICATION? 
The previous Part primarily focused on why legislative novelty 
does not suggest that prior Congresses assumed that a statute was 
unconstitutional. Perhaps because legislative novelty does not reliably 
signal Congress’s assumptions about the Constitution, more recent 
cases have adopted slightly different antinovelty rhetoric. NFIB and 
Free Enterprise Fund framed the issue as follows: “Sometimes ‘the 
most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the 
lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”256 This formulation 
suggests that legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional defect, 
full stop. It omits the Court’s earlier explanation for why legislative 
novelty is a sign of a constitutional defect, namely because legislative 
novelty suggests that prior Congresses assumed that a statute was 
unconstitutional. And it does not include any other explanation for 
why legislative novelty might be a sign of a constitutional defect.  
But why might legislative novelty be evidence that a statute is 
unconstitutional? In the best of circumstances, it could only signal that 
prior Congresses’ view was that a statute was unconstitutional. How 
could legislative novelty reveal something about a statute’s actual 
constitutionality, as opposed to Congress’s views about the statute’s 
constitutionality? Part III.A argues that there is nothing in 
conventional sources of constitutional law that suggests that legislative 
 
 255. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (joining “the Court’s opinion except for those parts relying on the 
legislative history”); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 253 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (joining the Court’s opinion except for a footnote mentioning “that the 
legislative history supports what the statute unambiguously says”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
594 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The cases improperly rely on legislative 
history, broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inaction in order 
to preempt state law.”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We 
are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).  
 256. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2009)). 
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novelty is, or should be used as, evidence that a statute is 
unconstitutional.  
Whether legislative novelty itself could make a statute 
unconstitutional turns on broader questions about the proper 
relationship between the conduct of the branches and actual 
constitutionality, specifically when one branch’s actions can make 
something true as a constitutional matter. For example, Congress’s 
enactment of statutes may make those statutes constitutional if the 
existence of similar congressional statutes—or a longstanding pattern 
of them—is evidence, or should be used as evidence, of those statutes’ 
constitutionality. Part III.B explains why, even if such a pattern is the 
case for legislative action, it is not the case for legislative novelty—that 
is, why Congress’s previous inaction does not make a statute 
unconstitutional.  
Part III.C then discusses a recent justification that has been 
offered for why legislative novelty should be used as evidence that a 
statute is unconstitutional. Some scholars and judges have argued that 
legislative novelty should be used as evidence of unconstitutionality to 
limit Congress’s powers, which purportedly extend well beyond the 
understandings of those powers as they existed when the Constitution 
was ratified. Part III.C rejects the argument that legislative novelty 
should be used as a means to limit Congress’s powers.  
A. The Constitution on Novelty and Actual Unconstitutionality  
Conventional sources of constitutional law do not suggest that 
legislative novelty matters, or should matter, when determining 
whether a statute is constitutional. Rather, many of the conventional 
sources of constitutional law—such as the text, structure, precedent, 
and the values that the Constitution serves—suggest that legislative 
novelty should not matter when determining a statute’s 
constitutionality. 
1. Text.  There is no antinovelty provision in the constitutional 
text.257 There are instead a host of power-granting provisions that are 
at odds with a presumption that novel statutes are unconstitutional. In 
particular, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides, “The Congress 
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
 
 257. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (“Our constitutional principles 
of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation.”). 
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Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.”258 Professor John Manning has explained how the clause 
delegates to Congress the power to design innovative governmental 
structures and regulatory programs: the Necessary and Proper Clause 
creates an “open-ended delegation.”259 The clause allows Congress to 
pass laws that effectuate powers delegated to any branch of the federal 
government, and it, unlike other clauses, specifically “identifies 
Congress as the recipient of” its delegation of power.260 A default rule 
against novel statutes is therefore “at odds with the constitutional 
allocation of implementation authority to Congress.”261  
Other provisions are similarly at odds with a default presumption 
that novel federal statutes are unconstitutional. The Tenth 
Amendment, for example, refers to “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution” rather than powers that are 
enumerated by the Constitution.262 The phrase “not delegated” implies 
the existence of some powers not specifically enumerated by the 
constitutional text,263 and the Court has implied some congressional 
powers that are not specifically enumerated in the constitutional text.264  
2. Structure.  The Constitution’s structure also undermines the idea 
that antinovelty is a constitutional value. The Constitution partially 
reflects a design to empower Congress and provide it with authority to 
respond to pressing national issues. The Constitution enumerates an 
expansive list of powers and contemplates that the federal government 
has powers other than those that are specifically enumerated. From 
these and other sources, the Court has inferred that the structure of the 
Constitution implicitly delegates powers to the federal government 
that enable the federal government to serve national ends, such as 
 
 258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 259. John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of 
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 62 (2014). 
 260. Id. For a discussion of Hamilton’s similar views, see Daniel A. Farber, The Story of 
McCulloch: Banking on National Power, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 679, 687–88 (2004).  
 261. Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 1607, 1639 (2015). 
 262. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added). 
 263. The Tenth Amendment was enacted together with the Ninth Amendment, which refers 
to “enumeration” rather than delegation. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 264. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1135 & n.35 (2001) (listing as examples the power to regulate immigration, 
the power over foreign affairs and diplomatic relations, and the power to protect the American 
flag as a national symbol, as well as others); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of 
Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1394–1401 (2010) (listing examples). 
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effectively exercising those powers delegated to it, as well as advancing 
values of unity, cohesion, and coordination.265 And a universal 
skepticism of novel federal statutes would be inconsistent with a 
structure that purports to empower the federal legislature to respond 
to national problems and promote national values.  
Moreover, the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric does not just prevent 
Congress and the executive from adapting to changing problems. It 
also prevents states from adapting to changing problems, thereby 
undermining the values of federalism and state autonomy. The first 
case in which the Court floated the importance of legislative novelty 
was New York, a case that involved an agreement between the states 
and the federal government to address problems with the disposal of 
radioactive waste. The states had lobbied for the statute that the New 
York Court held to be unconstitutional, so the Court’s opinion, based 
upon antinovelty rhetoric, precluded both state and federal 
innovation.266  
3. Constitutionalism.  A universal skepticism of novel statutes 
would also be inconsistent with several of the Constitution’s purposes. 
One purpose of the Constitution, and an important value it realizes, is 
to provide substantial room for democratic decisionmaking.267 Another 
purpose is to provide a workable and enduring structure of 
 
 265. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of 
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010) (“A federal constitution ideally gives the 
central and state governments the power to do what each does best.”). The Court occasionally 
invokes this kind of reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142–43 (2010) 
(construing federal custodial power based on the assumption that the federal government could 
prevent “an interstate epidemic”). Commentators have spelled out some of the ends of 
nationalism, such as having a federal government that is capable of effectively exercising those 
powers delegated to it, as well as unity, cohesion, and coordination. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1158–63 (1988) (describing nationalist 
premises of federal courts doctrines); Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1085, 1085–86 (2014). 
 266. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
 267. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates 
that democracy is the appropriate process for change . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy 
and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792–93 (2005). Primus has also noted:  
Part of the Constitution’s legitimacy derives from its ability to deliver tolerable levels 
of substantive justice; part from the fact that citizens identify subjectively with the 
system of constitutional government and claim it as their own; part from the fact that 
the Constitution leaves a relatively broad field of play for democratic decisionmaking, 
albeit subject to certain constraints. 
Primus, supra note 113, at 200–01. 
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government.268 The Constitution allows Congress to provide, by 
legislation, for “exigencies . . . as they occur.”269 The antinovelty 
principle fails to appreciably accommodate these purposes because the 
principle would hamstring the legislature’s ability to respond to 
problems or resolve disagreements that did not materialize early in 
U.S. history.  
4. Precedent.  A universal skepticism of novel statutes is also at 
odds with other precedent, especially that which establishes a 
presumption of constitutionality for federal statutes.270 “Proper respect 
for a co-ordinate branch of the government” requires that courts strike 
down an act of Congress only when “the lack of constitutional 
authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.”271 
Courts have accordingly afforded a “presumption of constitutionality” 
to federal statutes.272 As the D.C. Circuit recognized when it applied 
that presumption to the ACA’s minimum-coverage requirement, 
courts “are obliged . . . to presume that acts of Congress are 
constitutional.”273 
5. History.  Historical sources do not say much about whether 
legislative novelty is evidence of unconstitutionality. The sources 
typically used by originalists—the Federalist Papers, Convention 
records, and other statements indicative of contemporary public 
opinion—are not principally concerned with how to determine 
whether federal statutes are unconstitutional, as opposed to what the 
Constitution does and does not permit. And Professor H. Jefferson 
Powell has argued that legal traditions contemporaneous with the 
 
 268. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (describing the Constitution 
as a system of government that would “endure for ages to come” and “be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs”). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Some justifications for a presumption of constitutionality turn on the assumption that a 
statute represents Congress’s belief that the statute is constitutional. These justifications may be 
called into question by this Article’s critique of the antinovelty principle, but other justifications 
are not. 
 271. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883); see also Ogdens v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 
(12 What.) 213, 270 (1827) (explaining that “respect” for “the wisdom, the integrity; and the 
patriotism of the legislative body” compels the Court to “presume in favour of [a law’s] validity, 
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt”). 
 272. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 410); see Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2139 (“The principle that the Court must 
presume laws constitutional is as old as judicial review.”). 
 273. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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ratification of the Constitution do not suggest that the Constitution 
should be interpreted only in accordance with its original meaning.274  
6. Congressional Practice.  Another way of thinking about whether 
legislative novelty might indicate that a statute is unconstitutional is to 
ask what other kinds of federal laws might have been constitutionally 
suspect given their novelty. One measure of any constitutional theory 
is whether it “achieve[s] descriptive accuracy.”275 On this metric, the 
idea that legislative novelty indicates a constitutional infirmity does not 
fare well. Everything is new the first time it is enacted, and many 
different kinds of laws are not similar to laws that were enacted in the 
first several sessions of Congress. Here are some examples of new areas 
of regulation: 
• Antidiscrimination.276  The first federal prohibition on private 
entities discriminating on the basis of race was the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875.277 Today, federal law prohibits private entities from 
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and 
national origin, among other traits.278 
• Maternal Health.  The 1921 Maternity Act279 was likely the first 
federal regulation of maternal health.280 Today, the Maternal and 
 
 274. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Framers’ expectation of constitutional interpretation 
does not support an interpretive strategy based on the Framers’ intent). 
 275. Fallon, supra note 97, at 1203; David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 
CALIF. L. REV. 581, 582 (1999) (explaining why a constitutional theory “cannot call for a 
wholesale departure from existing practices”). 
 276. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1–17 (2012). 
 277. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2014) (describing how the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 treated race discrimination in public accommodations as a violation of civil, rather than 
merely social, rights). That legislation was enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, which the Court invalidated. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883). Civil rights legislation is now enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964). 
 278. Congress has not yet enacted one of the bills that would explicitly prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See, e.g., Equality Act, H.R. 3185,  
114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3185 [https://perma.
cc/LF2Q-6FVJ]. 
 279. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (declining to hear a challenge to the 
Maternity Act). 
 280. See Kate E. Ryan, Mandating Coverage for Maternity Length of Stays: Certain Problems 
with the Good Idea, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 271, 295 (1996) (identifying the Maternity Act as the first 
federal regulation of maternal health). Although Congress had provided cash or pension benefits 
to war widows, these measures were not designed to establish or affect standards for maternal 
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Child Health division of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) conducts a variety of programs and initiatives 
“to improve maternal and child health.”281 
• Vaccines.  It was not until 1813 that Congress established a 
National Vaccine Agency, and the agency, at the time, had power 
only to make vaccines available postage free.282 It was not until 
1944 that Congress established a federal preclearance regime for 
vaccination, the first federal regulation of vaccine standards.283 
Today, vaccines are regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) as well as other federal agencies, such as 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.284 Federal law 
also establishes a remedy for individuals injured by vaccines.285  
• Animal Health.  The Animal Welfare Act,286 a federal law “that 
regulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition, 
transport, and by dealers,”287 was not enacted until 1966. Today, 
the Center for Animal Welfare Section of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture288 and the Animal and Veterinary Section of the 
FDA work together toward animal health.289  
• Insurance.  Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was the 
first federal statute that outlawed monopolistic business 
 
health care. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law 
and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1782–1802 (2005) (describing 
pension allotments). 
 281. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Programs & 
Initiatives, HRSA MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH, http://mchb.hrsa.gov/programs/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ALB-M6NZ]. 
 282. Law of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 37 (repealed 1822), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/vaccines/
vac_act_1813.pdf [https://perma.cc/87YZ-659M]. 
 283. Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 702 (1944), http://uscode.
house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=58&page=702 [https://perma.cc/LV6U-RCWZ]. 
 284. Vaccines, VACCINES, BLOOD & BIOLOGICS, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/Vaccines/ [https://perma.cc/GJL9-MG5F].  
 285. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa1–34 (2012); 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR., http://www.nvic.org/
Vaccine-Laws/1986-Vaccine-Injury-Law.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HFF-TE37]. 
 286. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 54 (2013).  
 287. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal Welfare Act, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT’L AGRIC. LIBR., 
https://awic.nal.usda.gov/government-and-professional-resources/federal-laws/animal-welfare-
act [https://perma.cc/A6DS-DMNZ]. 
 288. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal Welfare, ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION  
SERV., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare [https://perma.cc/P6
TC-SJRJ]. 
 289. About FDA, ABOUT THE CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/
centersoffices/officeoffoods/cvm/default.htm [https://perma.cc/VYC4-F5BM]. 
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practices.290 It was not until the 1940s that the Court concluded 
that Congress could regulate insurance under that statute.291 
Before that, the Court had suggested that insurance was an area 
of regulation reserved to the states.292 Today, federal law 
regulates many different kinds of insurance—unemployment 
insurance, health insurance, crop insurance, and livestock 
insurance, among others.293  
There are similarly many examples of new forms of regulation that 
span myriad areas of regulation: 
• Conditional Spending.  When Congress initially started providing 
federal money to states, it merely designated that money for use 
in particular areas—to support public schools, for example, or to 
build roads.294 Not until the late 1800s did Congress start adding 
conditions to federal grants that required states to comply with 
certain regulatory directives in addition to requiring the states to 
use the federal money toward a general project.295 Since then, 
Congress has enacted different kinds of conditions. Some 
conditions require states to enact laws that conform to certain 
regulatory directives.296 Other conditions are more procedural—
they require states to institute a means for preventing fraud with 
federal monies297 or require states to create an enforcement 
bureau independent from the regulatory arm that implements the 
program.298 There is a huge variety among the different 
conditions that are imposed on states in programs such as 
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, civil rights 
programs under the Individual with Disabilities in Education Act, 
 
 290. The Antitrust Laws, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/TC4G-R2T9]. 
 291. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), superseded by statute 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1970). 
 292. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 182–83 (1868). 
 293. E.g., Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); 26 U.S.C. ch. 23; Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 80 Stat. 829 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 294. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 847, 871 (1979). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Pasachoff, supra note 198, at 259, 271–73 (noting such conditions). New York 
confirmed that conditional spending is a constitutional means of regulating the states. New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).  
 297. See Pasachoff, supra note 198, at 271–73 (discussing conditions on federal grants). 
 298. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 251–52 (2011) (involving such 
a condition). 
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Social Security, and environmental programs under the Clean 
Water Act and the Clean Air Act (CAA).299 
• Conditional Preemption (and Other Varieties).  Conditional 
preemption occurs when federal statutes preclude all state laws 
in a particular area unless state law conforms to federal directives. 
Early preemptive statutes did not conditionally preempt state 
laws;300 conditional preemption is routinely described as a 
twentieth century innovation.301 Some examples of conditional 
preemption include provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005,302 the CAA,303 and the ACA.304 Some federal statutes also 
“completely” preempt state laws.305 These statutes turn what 
would otherwise be state law claims into federal ones.306 The only 
statutes that completely preempt state laws, however, are of fairly 
recent vintage, including section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (1947),307 the National Bank Act (1863),308 and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974).309 
• Delegations to Federal Agencies.  The precise historical analogs to 
the administrative state are subject to debate. But it is safe to say 
 
 299. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1271–83 (2009) (discussing conditions in some of these statutes); Pasachoff, supra note 
198, at 267–69 (same).  
 300. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124; Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; An Act to 
Regulate Collection of Duties and Tonnage of 1799, 1 Stat. 627.  
 301. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL 
STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY 6–7 (1992), http://www.library.
unt.edu/gpo/acir/reports/policy/a-121.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6G4-QEE2] 
 302. See R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering, and the Values of 
Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPACT, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 406 
(2008) (referencing the Energy Policy Act as an example of conditional preemption). 
 303. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 474, 480 (2012) (using the Clean Air Act as an example of conditional 
preemption). 
 304. See Gluck, supra note 197, at 585–86 (“[S]tates are the default and preferred 
implementers of the new federal program, but there is a federal ‘fallback’: the federal government 
must operate these programs should states prove unable to do so or if they opt out.”). 
 305. See Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 549–50 
(2004) (listing examples). 
 306. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003) (explaining that the question 
is “whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than . . . whether 
Congress intended that the cause of action be removable”). 
 307. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 559–60 
(1968). 
 308. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 5. 
 309. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 581 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (holding that Congress intended 
ERISA to completely preempt state law in this area).  
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that early analogs to the federal bureaucracy did not affirmatively 
delegate the kind of far-reaching authority that agencies exercise 
today to prescribe binding regulations. The delegation to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 is generally seen 
as the first delegation of rulemaking authority significant enough 
to resemble modern agencies.310 Today, many agencies exercise 
broad grants of power: the EPA,311 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),312 the DHHS,313 the Department of Labor,314 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),315 among others. 
Congress also sometimes provides agencies with new kinds of 
powers. For example, it allows agencies to render statutory 
provisions without force or legal effect.316 
• Agency Structure.  Congress also regulates the structure of newly 
created agencies in new ways: it insulates some agency heads 
from presidential removal, it establishes a period of tenure for 
agency heads, it establishes multiperson bodies to oversee an 
agency or area within an agency, and it requires multimember 
agency bodies to include equal numbers of Republican and 
Democratic members.317 Many different agencies have different 
structures, which could not exist before the delegation of 
authority to the ICC. Only in the late 1800s did Congress begin 
insulating agencies from presidential removal.318 Today, these 
agencies include the Federal Communications Commission 
 
 310. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 (2013); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation 
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189, 1206 (1986). 
 311. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining the 
delegation of authority to the EPA “to protect the public health” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) 
(2012))).  
 312. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (explaining that the 
delegation of authority should be used “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012))). 
 313. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209–12 (1988) (listing several 
delegations of rulemaking authority). 
 314. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (describing 
delegation). 
 315. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 632 n.1 (1950) (describing 
delegation). 
 316. Deacon, supra note 225, at 1551, 1561–64 (describing this authority and noting the 
discussion of historical analogs in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)). 
 317. Datla & Revesz, supra note 310, at 786–99 (surveying these restrictions). 
 318. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).  
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(FCC), the Federal Election Commission, the FTC, the SEC, and 
the CFPB.319  
• All Federal Agency Actions.  Because federal agencies exercise 
powers delegated to them by Congress,320 agencies may exercise 
only those powers that Congress has under the Constitution. 
Under the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric, any field in which an 
agency is regulating and any form that an agency regulation takes 
presumably needs to have some historical analog from the first 
twenty to fifty years of the United States. Yet agencies today 
regulate in many areas and in many forms that did not exist then. 
Consider these examples: 
o EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rule.  To regulate 
greenhouse gases, the EPA embarked on “the single 
largest expansion in the scope of the [CAA] in its 
history,” requiring entities that release more than a 
certain amount of greenhouse gasses to obtain a 
permit for constructions and modifications, subject 
to certain exceptions.321  
o EPA’s Clean Power Plan.  The EPA established CO2 
emission standards for new, modified, and 
reconstructed power plants and requirements for 
states to follow in developing plans to limit CO2 from 
existing plants.322 The former involved improving 
heat rates at coal-fired plants, substituting natural-
gas plants for steam plants, and substituting 
renewable-energy generating capacity for 
generation from fossil-fuel-fired plants.323 The latter 
entailed state-specific emission goals tied to both the 
mass and rate of emissions.324 
 
 319. See id. at 12–18; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)–(c) (2012) (establishing the position of 
Director of the CFPB as removable only for cause).  
 320. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (centering on a 
delegation of authority “to protect the public health” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012))).  
 321. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–38 (2014) (describing the history 
of this regulation). 
 322. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and 98); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60).  
 323. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
64,666–67.  
 324. Id. at 64,820.  
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o FCC’s Net Neutrality Rule.  The FCC recently 
classified the Internet as a telecommunication 
service and then prohibited broadband providers 
from “blocking ‘lawful content, applications, 
services, or non-harmful devices’ or throttling 
(degrading or impairing) access to the same”; from 
“favor[ing] some traffic over other traffic . . . in 
exchange for consideration . . . or to benefit an 
affiliated entity”; or from “unreasonably interfering 
with or unreasonably disadvantaging” users’ ability 
to use broadband Internet access service or content 
providers’ ability to make content or items available 
to users.325 
o The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Credit 
Swaps Rule.  The 2010 Dodd–Frank Act directed the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
to oversee the United States “swaps” market, which 
had previously been largely unregulated.326 The 
CFTC then imposed a host of regulations on swap 
transactions, including a requirement that they be 
performed on certain markets subject to certain 
monitoring and requirements of the CFTC.327 
The Congresses that enacted these statutes did not operate under 
the assumption that they could only enact statutes that were 
sufficiently analogous to laws enacted in the first twenty to fifty years 
of the United States. Moreover, the fact that the Court’s antinovelty 
rhetoric would have called into question many different kinds of 
federal laws suggests that an antinovelty principle would fail to reflect 
too much of constitutional law to be a viable interpretive theory. At a 
minimum, the antinovelty rhetoric’s potentially far-reaching 
implications suggest the rhetoric’s application is, at best, selective, 
which is another reason to doubt the validity of antinovelty rhetoric as 
a canon of constitutional interpretation.328  
 
 325. U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 326. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).  
 327. Swap Execution Facilities, 17 C.F.R. § 37 (2016).  
 328. See supra Part I.B. 
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B. Conduct and Actual Constitutionality: Comparing Congressional 
Action and Inaction  
The idea that the absence of similar federal statutes is evidence 
that a statute is unconstitutional is the inverse of an idea associated 
with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland—
namely, that the existence of many, similar federal statutes is evidence 
that a statute is constitutional.329 Several critiques of the Supreme 
Court’s antinovelty rhetoric apply equally to the McCulloch principle: 
Congress’s enactment of a statute may not reflect Congress’s 
assumption that a statute is constitutional. And although longstanding 
statutes may exist, perhaps the facts or our values have changed to a 
point where the statute’s historical presence should not matter.  
That being said, there are other reasons—besides the idea that 
legislative enactments reflect Congress’s view that a statute is 
constitutional—why the existence of similar statutes may and should 
be used as evidence of a statute’s constitutionality. The McCulloch 
principle may illustrate how Congress’s conduct sometimes affects the 
“actual constitutionality” of a statute for reasons unrelated to 
Congress’s assumptions about a statute’s constitutionality. Though this 
Part does not defend the McCulloch principle, it highlights how some 
of the potential justifications for it do not apply to the idea that 
legislative novelty is evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. The 
contrast between the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric and the McCulloch 
principle, therefore, illustrates why legislative novelty should not be 
used as evidence that a statute is unconstitutional. 
1. Congressional Action as a Sign of Congress’s Views.  Some 
explanations for incorporating congressional practice into 
constitutional interpretation maintain that congressional practice 
 
 329. For ease of reference, this Part refers to this idea as the “McCulloch principle,” although 
it differs slightly from Chief Justice Marshall’s framing. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote:  
[A] doubtful question . . . [regarding] the respective powers of those who are equally 
the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put to rest by the practice 
of the government . . . . An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by 
legislative acts . . . ought not to be lightly disregarded. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). Judge Kavanaugh’s recent opinion 
holding the CFPB’s structure to be unconstitutional explicitly framed the Supreme Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric together with the McCulloch principle because both reflected the same idea 
“that history and tradition are important guides.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 
F.3d 1, 21–23 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 
2017). 
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embodies Congress’s assumptions about the Constitution. Congress is 
“interpreting” or “constructing” the Constitution in the course of 
passing statutes, the argument goes, and statutes therefore represent 
Congress’s views about the constitutional text.330 Chief Justice Marshall 
described “legislative acts” as “exposition[s] of the constitution” in the 
course of explaining why constitutional interpretation should consider 
congressional practice.331 The idea that Congress, in the course of 
enacting statutes, also interprets the Constitution is related to the 
concept of liquidation. In the Federalist Papers, Madison observed that 
“[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and 
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as 
more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated 
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and 
adjudications.”332 Professor Caleb Nelson has suggested that “the 
founding generation[] . . . expected subsequent practice to liquidate the 
indeterminacy [of the constitutional text] and to produce a fixed 
meaning for the future.”333 And Madison and others believed that those 
subsequent practices could include congressional statutes, or at least 
statutes that were the product of some deliberation.334  
But Part II’s critique of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric casts 
doubt on these justifications. Just as in the case of congressional 
inaction, where Congress’s conduct (not enacting a kind of statute) 
does not reflect Congress’s assumptions about a statute’s 
constitutionality (that such statutes are unconstitutional), the same is 
true in many cases for congressional action. That is, Congress’s 
enactment of a statute may not reflect Congress’s assumption that the 
statute is constitutional, at least in the sense that the statute is 
constitutional because it is consistent with the constitutional text. It is 
 
 330. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004) (advancing this 
argument); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) 
(same); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, 
and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (describing how incorporating 
congressional practice into constitutional interpretation is related to the idea that nonjudicial acts 
may constitute precedent).  
 331. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. 
 332. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 1236 (James Madison) (James E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also 
Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott ed., 1867) (“It could not 
but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of 
opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases . . . and that it might require a 
regular course of practice to liquidate [and] settle the meaning of some of them.”).  
 333. Nelson, supra note 233, at 547. 
 334. Id. at 526–29. 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
1468  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1407 
fairly easy to see why: in the course of enacting a statute, there is no 
guarantee that Congress has actually considered the extent of its 
constitutional powers or whether a statute is consistent with the 
requirements of the constitutional text.335 Many members of Congress 
may not be lawyers or well-versed in constitutional law, and quickly 
enacted legislation may not be subject to any rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny. Congress also has a limited amount of time and resources, 
which it might not devote to abstract questions of constitutional law,336 
and the myriad reasons why Congress does not enact statutes—
constituent preferences and political expediency, among others—also 
explain why Congress enacts statutes that do not embody or reflect any 
consideration of whether the statute is constitutional. Congressional 
representatives concerned with reelection will focus on their 
constituents’ wishes and concerns, which may not include questions of 
constitutional power.  
2. Congressional Action as Congressional Conduct.  Even though 
Congress’s enactment of a statute may not reliably signal Congress’s 
assumption that the statute is constitutional, there may still be reasons 
to treat Congress’s enactment of a statute as evidence of a statute’s 
constitutionality. This subsection does not purport to offer a complete 
defense of that idea, but it outlines some possible justifications for 
treating the enactment of a statute as evidence of the statute’s 
constitutionality that are not called into question by the critiques of the 
Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. These justifications include acquiescence, 
choices to prefer legislative value choices over judicial ones, broader 
understandings of constitutional interpretation, and advancement of 
other constitutional values, such as providing room for democratic 
decisionmaking or promoting the rule of law.  
a. Acquiescence.  One reason judges may assume that a 
longstanding pattern of congressional statutes is constitutional is 
because the political branches have “acquiesced” to the arrangement 
 
 335. See Mark Tushnet, Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional 
Interpretation? Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 499, 502 (2009) (“When enacting a statute Congress has no obligation to address 
constitutional questions directly, and, as noted below, may not even notice the presence of such 
questions.”).  
 336. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1283 (2001) (explaining why Congress may not consider constitutional 
questions). 
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provided for by those statutes.337 To the extent a law alters the division 
of power between Congress and the executive, both entities have 
acquiesced, or consented, to that arrangement, and the statute might 
be viewed as legitimate for that reason,338 whether or not the branches 
are acquiescing to any claim that the statute is consistent with the 
constitutional text’s requirements.339 Moreover, even if acquiescence 
might suffice as a justification for separation-of-powers questions, it 
might not suffice as a justification for federalism questions. Although 
a federal law may reflect Congress’s views about the meaning of 
constitutional federalism, it may not reflect the states’ views. There are 
differing views on the extent to which Congress—in particular the 
Senate—represents the states’ views,340 especially in light of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which made Senators directly elected by the 
people.341  
b. Legislative Value Choices.  One might also incorporate 
congressional practice into constitutional interpretation to prioritize 
Congress’s legislative value choices when the text is ambiguous or 
when it permits more than one reasonable interpretation.342 The text 
can only say so much, and it often speaks in vague generalities. Bradley 
and Morrison, for example, argue that interpreters rely on historical 
practice to determine the scope of the President’s powers under Article 
II because little constitutional text speaks to those questions.343 
Something similar could be said for questions about the proper scope 
of Congress’s delegated powers vis-à-vis the states. The enumerated 
list of congressional powers contains several ambiguously worded 
provisions. The Necessary and Proper Clause, for example, provides 
Congress with the power to make “all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,”344 and 
the phrase “necessary and proper” is, as John Manning has observed, 
 
 337. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 418. 
 338. Id. 
 339. There are also both theoretical and practical difficulties with acquiescence. See generally 
Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016) (describing 
these difficulties). 
 340. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 224–25 (2000) (summarizing different positions). 
 341. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 342. Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority 
from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 83 (2003). 
 343. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 417–18. 
 344. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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an “open-ended term[].”345 Elsewhere, Article I, Section 8 authorizes 
Congress to “provide for . . . the general welfare of the United 
States.”346 The phrase “general welfare” does little to resolve questions 
like whether Congress may amend the terms on which states receive 
federal money347 or whether Congress may condition a state’s receipt 
of funds on the state’s acceptance of terms that are unrelated to the 
funds’ purpose.348 The Supreme Court has also held that Congress has 
some powers because of the Constitution’s structure, rather than 
because of any particular grant of express authority.349 If the text 
permissibly allows for multiple interpretations or does not reach a 
particular issue, decisionmakers might have reasons to select legislative 
value choices over judicial ones.  
c. Interpretation of Nontextual Sources.  Relatedly, it might be the 
case that congressional statutes represent constitutional 
determinations even if Congress never considers whether a statute is 
consistent with the constitutional text. James Bradley Thayer’s original 
argument for judicial deference maintained that many constitutional 
questions involve more than technical legal issues like the precise 
meaning of the constitutional text.350 Rather, Thayer argued, 
constitutional questions also turn on broader issues of constitutional 
policy and politics.351 In this light, Congress’s assessment of how to best 
serve the national interest or how to realize particular constitutional 
values, such as liberty or equality, is just as much a constitutional 
determination as whether the text of the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to enact a particular law. Congressional statutes, therefore, 
may serve epistemic ends in resolving constitutional questions because 
 
 345. Manning, supra note 259, at 53. 
 346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Those who ratified the Constitution disagreed about whether that 
provision permitted Congress to spend only in areas within its other delegated powers. See United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“Since the foundation of the Nation sharp differences of 
opinion have persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase [‘for the general welfare’].”). 
 347. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–02 (2012). 
 348. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
 349. See Primus, supra note 183, at 588.  
 350. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893). 
 351. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 336, at 1279–80; see also Karlan, supra 106, at 67 
(“[M]any of the constitutional cases before the Supreme Court are there precisely because they 
raise hard questions that cannot be answered simply by bringing technical acumen to bear.”). 
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they embody judgments about our political priorities and how they 
should be effectuated.352  
Another way of getting at the point is to ask whether a statute’s 
constitutionality turns only on whether that statute conforms to the 
text’s requirements. Many constitutional issues are not resolved this 
way.353 Consider, for example, different uses of historical arguments in 
constitutional law. Occasionally historical analysis incorporates history 
as a way of “teach[ing] lessons.”354 Historical reflection can ground 
principles in experience, but the significance of that experience 
requires some normative evaluation. For example, Professor Michael 
Dorf has argued that one example of how “[h]istory teaches lessons” 
in constitutional law is the way in which the Great Depression and the 
period leading up to the New Deal factored into the Supreme Court’s 
post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases. According to Dorf, these 
cases incorporated “laissez-faire’s inability to revive industrial activity 
during a depression.”355 This lesson turns on a judgment about the 
inadequacy of laissez-faire economics, which entails both a descriptive 
assessment of facts as they existed in the world and a normative 
evaluation of the perceived adequacy (or inadequacy) of that state of 
affairs. And congressional statutes may reflect descriptive and 
normative assessments about facts as they exist or have existed in the 
world even if they do not reliably reflect interpretations of the 
constitutional text, to the extent that interpretations of the text and 
assessments about the facts in the world are independent.  
Statutes may also embody other kinds of judgments relevant to 
constitutional interpretation. For example, some have argued that 
public opinion may sometimes properly factor into constitutional 
analysis356 and congressional statutes may incorporate some 
assessment—or at least an educated guess—about how the public feels 
about a statute, including whether it is constitutional in some broad 
sense. Sometimes, political and social movements—and their ability to 
persuade others of their causes—help to establish certain 
 
 352. See Karlan, supra note 106, at 24–25 (urging deference on these grounds). 
 353. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 238, at 4 (claiming that “constitutional ‘interpretation’ 
usually has little to do with the words of the text”).  
 354. Dorf, supra note 241, at 1815.  
 355. Id. 
 356. See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1207, 1209–10 (2010) (“Just as the text of a constitutional clause or the requirements of a 
precedential doctrine can guide good-faith constitutional adjudication, so can the fact that public 
consensus supports a particular view.”). 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
1472  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1407 
constitutional rules and determine the content or meaning of 
previously established ones.357 And statutes, like judicial opinions, may 
reflect assessments about political and social movements and their 
causes. Congress may also have constitutional doctrine in mind as it 
enacts statutes, even if it does not have in mind the constitutional text 
or the original meaning of that text.  
d. Constitutional Values: Democracy and the Rule of Law.  
Another justification for presuming that statutes are constitutional is 
that judicial review—at least the act of striking down statutes—is 
always inherently antidemocratic.358 Congress is accountable to the 
people via elections, and federal judges are not. Although any form of 
constitutional democracy will be antidemocratic in some respects, 
ensuring a wide space for democratic politics is one important value 
served by a constitution.359  
Incorporating congressional practice into constitutional 
interpretation may also bolster constitutional legitimacy in other ways. 
Under the familiar dead-hand critique of constitutionalism, it is a 
problem that the people are governed and limited by constitutional 
rules which they played no role in adopting.360 Relying on congressional 
practice to inform constitutional interpretation minimizes the gap 
between the past and the present, and with it, the dead-hand problem. 
When congressional practices inform constitutional interpretation, 
people in the present can affect the shape of constitutional rules by 
having their elected representatives enact statutes. Incorporating 
 
 357. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2038–42.  
 358. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2010). 
 359. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 
535, 549–50 (1999) (endeavoring to “provide a framework within which readers can determine 
how various constitutional theories should be assessed”). Democracy and the rule of law are not 
the only values that judges should consider and will occasionally conflict with other values. See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 43, 75–76 (1989). Democracy also does not necessarily mean that courts should 
mechanically defer to all decisions made by the elected branches of government. See id. at 76 
(proposing that the term “democracy . . . include both substantive constitutional values as well as 
the procedural norm of majority rule,” which “accords with the analysis of most political science 
theorists”); see also Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a 
Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1425–26 (1997) 
(noting two conceptions of democracy). 
 360. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 
YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (2003) (citing Thomas Jefferson at the time of the Founding as stating that 
“the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead”). 
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congressional practice into constitutional interpretation, however, may 
do more than mitigate concerns with constitutional legitimacy. Some 
have suggested that the Constitution “owes its status as supreme law to 
contemporary practices of acceptance.”361 Under this view, the 
Constitution is legitimate because individuals implicitly consent to it. 
But people implicitly consent only to existing practices, so the 
Constitution, to be legitimate, must closely conform to those 
practices.362 Congressional statutes may provide some evidence of the 
practices to which the relevant people consent.  
There are also rule-of-law reasons to incorporate congressional 
practice into constitutional interpretation.363 An interpretive practice 
that suddenly invalidates a large number of federal statutes may result 
in a sudden change in how the government works, thereby 
undermining rule-of-law values of stability and predictability.364 These 
rule-of-law justifications do not turn on whether statutes reflect 
Congress’s analysis of the text, but instead on the fact that many 
statutes exist and cannot suddenly cease to exist without jarring 
consequences. Moreover, judicial decisions purport to contain 
generally applicable principles and reasons why a statute is 
unconstitutional. Therefore, a decision which declares a statute that is 
similar to many other statutes to be unconstitutional will likely create 
challenges to similar statutes. Those challenges will succeed even if the 
Supreme Court does not decide to hear those other cases, because the 
lower courts will use the Supreme Court’s exposition of the 
Constitution to find those other statutes unconstitutional.  
e. Burkean Values.  Some have also offered Burkean justifications 
for incorporating congressional practice into constitutional 
interpretation. Burkean justifications speak to the importance of 
longstanding traditions and how such traditions may represent the 
collective wisdom of many generations.365 Traditions may speak to the 
 
 361. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positive Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2008). 
 362. See Primus, supra note 113, at 190. 
 363. See id. at 173 (“Probably all players in contemporary American constitutional law agree 
that . . . the rule of law . . . [is a] constitutional value[].”). 
 364. See id. at 211–13, 217–21; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 15, at 427 (“[R]eliance 
interests . . . can presumably arise as a result of governmental practices as well as judicial 
decisions.”). There may be certain kinds of federal laws that, if invalidated, would uniquely 
implicate concerns about reliance, settled expectations, and stability.  
 365. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 330, at 11 (outlining Burkean approaches to 
constitutional interpretation). 
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practicability and durability of constitutional rules,366 and longstanding 
congressional statutes may be evidence that such statutes are workable 
and durable.  
f. Raw Power.  In Thomas Hobbes’ words, “Reputation of power, 
is Power.”367 If Congress and the executive want to push forward, 
judges may be limited in their capacity to stem the tide because of their 
limited ability to stop a committed Congress and executive.368 Professor 
Lawrence Lessig has explained how, in the context of the Commerce 
Clause, the Court was able to enforce limited federal power at a time 
when Congress did not attempt to exercise much of it. But that ceased 
to be true once Congress had reason to enact multiple laws that 
exceeded prior understandings about the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power.369 Even rumblings that Congress and the executive 
are not inclined to enforce judicial decisions may be cause for 
concern,370 given the dangers of a system in which federal judicial 
rulings are openly ignored by other branches of government.371  
But there are serious realpolitick concerns even if Congress and 
the executive do not intend to openly defy judicial rulings. Judges issue 
decisions that provide purportedly generally applicable principles that 
explain why a case is decided in a particular way. If the reasons a judge 
gives for invalidating a particular federal statute apply to many 
different federal statutes, a decision invalidating a federal statute could 
invalidate all of those similar statutes. And there is no guarantee that 
Congress and the executive would replace those statutes if judges 
invalidate them. Thus, even the possibility of a lazy, gridlocked, or 
overburdened Congress may be reason for judges to be concerned 
about invalidating a statute that is similar to many other longstanding 
 
 366. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 892 (1996). 
 367. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 62 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651) (emphasis added). 
 368. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (James E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (maintaining that the judiciary would be the “least dangerous” and “weakest” of the 
branches because it has “no influence over either the sword or the purse”). 
 369. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 161.  
 370. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1015–
24 (2009) (identifying “external constraints” on judicial authority, including inefficacy or nullity 
of rulings because of resistance by political branches). 
 371. E.g., id. at 1027 (“Nearly everyone agrees that officials should regard themselves as 
normatively bound by judicial determinations in cases to which they are parties, at least outside 
the scope of patently ultra vires rulings.”). 
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ones. Even a motivated Congress might not be able to replace all of the 
statutes that could be invalidated. And even highly motivated judges 
cannot enact statutes, pass regulations, or set up a substitute for the 
administrative state. Thus, judges’ limited capacity to provide 
replacements may be why judges choose not to invalidate a statute that 
is similar to many other statutes that function as the backbone of the 
government’s day-to-day workings.  
g. Objective Versus Subjective Purposes.  There may also be 
reasons to attribute to Congress the assumption that the statutes it has 
enacted are constitutional. Doctrine frequently distinguishes between 
objective versus subjective purposes. Whereas subjective purpose 
refers to the actual views and motives held by enacting legislators, 
objective purpose refers to something else.372 That something else has 
been defined in different ways, but it encompasses something like “the 
interests, values, objectives, policy, and functions that the law should 
realize in a democracy”373 or “the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the 
corpus juris.”374 Others have equated a law’s objective purpose with its 
“expressive character,”375 that is, what a law objectively communicates. 
The precise meaning of “objective purpose” matters less than the 
concept of objective purpose. Objective purpose recognizes the 
possibility that a law may reflect a purpose that is not actually or 
subjectively held by the enacting legislature. And one “objective 
purpose” of a law might be for Congress to say that the statute is 
constitutional. An enacted statute might objectively communicate that 
Congress assumes the statute to be constitutional; at least, reasonable 
observers might infer as much from Congress’s enactment of a statute. 
Therefore, judges may elect to ascribe to Congress the view that an 
enacted statute is constitutional even if Congress did not actually hold 
that view. 
 
 372. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile 
it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute . . . discerning the subjective motivation 
of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”); Mitchell N. 
Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 26–27 (2001) (noting the difference between subjective and objective views). 
 373. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The 
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 75 (2002). 
 374. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 
79 (2006).  
 375. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
56–57 (2000). 
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3. Congress’s Conduct: Legislative Novelty.  As the previous 
subsection detailed, there may be reasons why Congress’s conduct—
acting as if statutes are constitutional—actually makes those statutes 
constitutional. Even if these reasons do not ultimately justify the 
presumption that a pattern of longstanding statutes is more likely to be 
constitutional, they certainly do not justify the Court’s antinovelty 
rhetoric. That is, they do not justify why Congress’s failure to enact a 
statute should make that statute unconstitutional.  
For example, treating congressional statutes as evidence of 
statutes’ constitutionality furthers rule-of-law values of predictability 
and consistency, and respects reliance interests that may build up 
around statutes. Enacting a statute begins a federal program with all of 
its accompanying administration, including personnel, buildings, 
dispensation of government benefits, and adjustments made by other 
federal and state agencies. A regulatory web and private parties’ 
expectations build up around a federal statute that is harder to change 
than the kinds of reliance interests or expectations that may build up 
around the absence of one.  
Even if there are some cases where reliance interests build up 
around the absence of a federal statute, it is unclear how often that 
might occur and whether doctrine should protect those reliance 
interests. Take the cases in which courts have invoked antinovelty 
rhetoric—regulated entities probably did not construct their businesses 
around whether a regulating agency had one layer or two layers of for-
cause removal376 or were headed by single- or multimember bodies.377 
And the many states that actively lobbied for the federal government 
to require state legislatures to enact federal directives did not rely on 
the federal government’s inability to do so.378 Moreover, whatever 
reliance interests may build up around the absence of a federal statute 
may not be reliance interests that the doctrine protects. For example, 
states may have set their budgets on an assumption that the federal 
government would not require the state legislature to enact certain 
laws or require state executives to enforce federal law. But that is not 
meaningfully different than if the state had set its budget on an 
assumption that state courts would not be required to enforce a new 
 
 376. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2009). 
 377. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). 
 378. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (“The sited state respondents 
focus their attention on the process by which the Act was formulated.”).  
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federal statute. Yet Congress may constitutionally require state courts 
to enforce federal law.379 States may also have set their budgets on an 
assumption that the state government would not be subject to a 
generally applicable regulatory obligation, such as a minimum-wage 
requirement. But Congress may constitutionally impose that obligation 
on the states.380 With respect to private entities, a private entity’s desire 
or expectation that it would not be subject to future regulation is 
typically not sufficient to immunize the entity from future regulation. 
Nor do the realpolitick justifications apply in the context of 
legislative novelty. Upholding statutes that prior Congresses thought 
to be unconstitutional might upset those earlier Congresses, but they 
are not around to do anything. Whereas invalidating a statute raises 
concerns about upsetting the day-to-day workings of the government, 
upholding statutes typically does not.  
The democracy-based explanation for why congressional statutes 
are treated as evidence of actual constitutionality also does not apply 
to the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric. Treating statutes as evidence of 
their constitutionality provides more room for democratic 
decisionmaking; treating Congress’s failure to enact a statute as 
evidence that Congress lacks constitutional power does not. Similarly, 
drawing a negative inference about a statute’s constitutionality from 
legislative novelty does not minimize the dead-hand problem. If 
anything, overruling the statute exacerbates it. Antinovelty rhetoric 
increases the extent to which the people are governed and limited by 
constitutional rules that they had no role in enacting by fixing 
constitutional meaning according to what the first several Congresses 
(or whatever set of previous Congresses) did not do.381 
The Burkean justification—the idea that longstanding traditions 
represent the collective wisdom of many generations and establish the 
workability of those traditions—may apply to the Supreme Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric, but it does not justify it. Under the McCulloch 
 
 379. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts are required to 
entertain FELA claims). 
 380. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (upholding the 
minimum-wage requirement as applied to the states). 
 381. This fixing, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to reject antinovelty rhetoric. Many forms 
of constitutionalism will have some type of dead-hand problem. See Stephen E. Sachs, The 
“Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2256 (2014) 
(“[A]ny constitution worth its salt may spend a good bit of time in exile.”). But some bases of 
constitutional legitimacy are not undermined by the dead-hand problem. See Primus, supra note 
113, at 199–202 (explaining that presentist, subjective identification with the preexisting regime 
resolves some of the dead-hand problem).  
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principle, the relevant tradition is a pattern of congressional statutes. 
It is reasonable to think that the congressional representatives who 
voted for a statute had some reason to do so and perhaps even that 
their vote indicates that they did not assume that the statute was a bad 
idea or disastrous. Moreover, if a statute has been around for a long 
time, it is possible to assess whether a statute or its analogues have 
resulted in a parade of horribles. So judges might be able to infer from 
the existence of similar statutes some kind of collective wisdom that is 
relevant to constitutional determinations, as well as the workability of 
a statute. 
That is less true when the relevant tradition is the absence of 
similar statutes. There is no clear “collective wisdom” generated by 
Congress not enacting a statute: Congress may not have enacted a 
statute because it did not think of it. Perhaps it did not enact a statute 
because the pertinent facts had not yet existed or because it could not 
get the statute through both houses of Congress. At the very least, it is 
a stretch to infer from legislative novelty that every, or even many, 
representatives thought that a statute was a bad idea or even 
unnecessary. Representatives likely had different reasons—if they had 
any at all—for not enacting a statute.382 And the absence of a statute 
does not mean that it would have been workable or durable.  
Moreover, in the case of the McCulloch principle, Burkean 
traditions are being used as a shield—Burkeanism insulates a federal 
statute from a constitutional challenge. But in the case of legislative 
novelty, Burkean traditions are being used as a sword—Burkeanism 
drives a constitutional challenge to a federal statute.383 When Burkean 
traditions function as a shield, they work together with other 
constitutional values, such as providing space for democratic 
decisionmaking. But when Burkean traditions function as a sword, they 
work against those constitutional values. And whatever the virtues of 
Burkeanism, it is not the only constitutional value. 
Finally, the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is more than just 
Burkeanism. Burkeanism emphasizes the value of continuity, and 
foreclosing change—or attempting to—is different than ensuring 
continuity, which would modulate any change that occurs. Congress 
 
 382. See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constituitonalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1493–94, 1506–07 (2007) (explaining that the number of individuals in 
agreement matters to Burkeanism and that individuals must answer the same question). 
 383. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 374–76 (2006) 
(explaining the difference between sword and shield Burkeanism). 
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
2017] DEBUNKING ANTINOVELTY 1479 
rarely enacts legislation that upends the status quo entirely. “[I]n a 
society in which revolution is not the order of the day, and in which all 
legislation occurs against a background of customs and understandings 
of the way things are done,” Congress is unlikely to frequently enact 
statutes that upend the entire system.384 Legislators use past statutes as 
guides. They rely on the accumulation of precedent, and they rely on 
whatever wisdom society has accumulated collectively.385 And if 
change occurs through any branch of government, the legislature and 
executive should be used rather than the courts. Congress has certain 
advantages in making changes, such as acquiring the requisite 
information.386  
C. Second-Best Solution: The Antinovelty Principle as a Limiting 
Principle  
The Supreme Court has never explained why legislative novelty is 
evidence of a constitutional problem aside from its earlier claim that 
legislative novelty means that prior Congresses assumed a statute was 
unconstitutional. But some scholars and court of appeals judges have 
justified the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric as a kind of second-best 
solution. Their justification says that it is unrealistic to expect courts to 
“undo” all of the existing statutes that are inconsistent with the original 
understandings of constitutional federalism or the separation of 
powers (at least, under their account of the relevant original 
understandings). But a principle that called into question all new 
federal statutes could be a means to ensure that Congress does not 
continue to transgress constitutional limits on its powers in new ways. 
Take the example of PCAOB. For purposes of PCAOB, the baseline 
constitutional principle is that the President has control over people 
who administer federal law. Congressional practice and doctrine have 
departed from this principle, but preventing Congress from enacting 
“new” restrictions on presidential control is a way to ensure that 
Congress does not stray even further.  
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in PCAOB hinted at this justification 
for the antinovelty principle. Judge Kavanaugh wrote, “The lack of 
 
 384. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
921, 942 (1992). 
 385. See Vermeule, supra note 382, at 1511–13 (explaining how legislators rely on 
accumulated wisdom). 
 386. See id. at 1508–11 (explaining how the legislature has advantages in acquiring 
information). 
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precedent for the PCAOB counsels great restraint by the Judiciary 
before approving this additional incursion on the President’s Article II 
powers.”387 He also reiterated this justification for the Court’s 
antinovelty rhetoric in a subsequent decision invalidating the CFPB’s 
structure.388 Barnett offered a similar account of why legislative novelty 
should matter in a lecture about NFIB. He argued that “all of the 
powers that were approved by the New Deal and Warren Courts are 
now to be taken as constitutional.”389 And because congressional 
power expanded significantly in the mid-20th century, “[g]oing any 
higher . . . requires special justification.”390 He concluded: “This 
[constitutional] gestalt can be summarized as ‘this far and no further’—
provided ‘no further’ is not taken as an absolute, but merely as 
establishing a baseline beyond which serious justification is needed.”391 
This account of the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric—the limiting-
principle approach—does not justify a far-reaching antinovelty 
principle, only one that would apply when Congress has departed 
from—and the Court has allowed Congress to depart from—the 
“correct” constitutional principle. This fact makes identifying the 
“correct” constitutional baseline important, and it is far from clear that 
PCAOB and NFIB were right on this score. It is unclear whether the 
Constitution requires any kind of presidential execution of federal 
law392 or whether the Constitution forbids a construction of Congress’s 
delegated powers that would effectively amount to a police power.393 
Even putting that concern aside, legislative novelty should not be used 
as a means to limit Congress’s powers by presumptively rendering 
unconstitutional all new federal statutes structuring agencies or 
presumptively rendering unconstitutional all new federal statutes on 
the ground that they likely exceed the scope of Congress’s delegated 
 
 387. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Katyal and Schmidt gestured in this direction 
as well. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 23, at 2149 n.193.  
 388. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (“The question before us is 
whether we may extend the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Executor precedent to cover this 
novel . . . agency structure . . . .”). 
 389. Barnett, supra note 112, at 1348.  
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing, on historical grounds, that it does not).  
 393. See Primus, supra note 183, at 576 (positing that the principle that Congress’s powers 
cannot add up to a police power is unsound). 
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powers. That approach to legislative novelty is arbitrary and difficult 
to administer, and it does not account for canonical precedents. 
1. Arbitrary.  Judge Kavanaugh and Barnett’s limiting-principle 
approach to the Court’s antinovelty rhetoric is arbitrary. Assume the 
correct constitutional rule is that executive officers must be removable 
by the President. A limiting-principle account acknowledges that the 
current structure of government no longer conforms to this principle 
and allows Congress to continue to depart from this principle, but only 
in ways that it has already done. That results in fairly arbitrary limits 
on Congress’s powers that make little sense of the constitutional 
principles that are purportedly at stake in these cases. For example, the 
D.C. Circuit maintained that the CFPB’s novelty meant that the 
CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional because it interfered with the 
President’s authority to execute federal law, “even if it does not 
occasion any additional diminishment of presidential power beyond 
the significant diminishment already caused by” the Supreme Court’s 
prior cases.394 
Additionally, permitting Congress to depart from the “correct” 
constitutional principle implicitly recognizes that other considerations 
may, at times, be sufficiently important to outweigh whatever value 
there is in holding Congress to the “correct” constitutional rule. But 
that may also be the case when Congress enacts a federal statute that 
differs from previous statutes. Perhaps a new area of regulation calls 
for different treatment, or perhaps there were unintended 
consequences or effects from previously existing regulations. 
Depending on the circumstances, any of these reasons may be similarly 
weighty to the reliance and rule-of-law interests that require federal 
judges not to strike down every single federal statute that purportedly 
violates the original understandings of constitutional federalism or the 
separation of powers.  
Moreover, the idea of grandfathering federal statutes without 
acknowledging their constitutionality is a little strange. Grandfathering 
is not a recognized way of deciding constitutional cases. If challenged, 
statutes are either upheld as constitutional, invalidated as 
unconstitutional, or remain as is without an assessment of their 
constitutionality because of various justiciability doctrines. 
Grandfathering in a litany of federal statutes means those statutes 
 
 394. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and 
reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).  
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would be upheld against a constitutional challenge, which implicitly 
recognizes that those statutes are, in some sense, constitutional. The 
reason they are constitutional may be because some constitutional 
change has occurred outside of the formal amendment process.395 But 
the fact that there has been constitutional change should cause us to 
revisit what the relevant constitutional baseline is and potentially 
determine new statutes’ constitutionality on that basis (that is, the 
currently existing constitutional baseline). The constitutional changes 
that occurred are so important and so entrenched that judges cannot 
roll them back, and the statutes that reflect those changes are accepted 
as part of the constitutional order. Instead of asking how to judicially 
enforce federalism given the increasing scope of congressional power, 
the question could instead be what the scope of federalism is in light of 
our constitutional practices.396 And judged under this conception of 
constitutional federalism, a new statute may not seem out of bounds.  
2. Administrability. Any antinovelty rhetoric raises 
administrability concerns because there does not appear to be a way to 
coherently define novelty. Using antinovelty rhetoric as a limiting 
principle raises additional administrability concerns because it would 
be difficult for judges to determine whether a statute is constitutional 
once they have determined that the statute is a new kind of statute. 
Whether a statute is “novel” turns on whether it is similar to 
previous ones. Accordingly, properly identifying the scope of that past 
practice is an important part of determining whether the antinovelty 
principle even applies, that is, determining whether a statute is new.397 
But historical traditions—specifically, whether current statutes are 
similar to preexisting ones—can be defined at different levels of 
 
 395. Various scholars have explained how constitutional change occurs outside the Article V 
amendment process. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12–13 (2010); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs 
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1056–57 (1984); Strauss, supra note 
366, at 905–06, 911–16.  
 396. Some may resist this claim on the ground that the “meaning” of a constitutional norm 
can never change. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact 
in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (explaining that the original meaning 
of the Constitution is fixed in time and carries forward today). Although that may be true of a 
provision’s semantic meaning, constitutional norms may be interpreted according to their 
contextual meaning, intended meaning, or reasonable meaning, as well as their interpreted 
meaning. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 242, at 1252–63.  
 397. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990) (“Moreover, historical traditions, like rights 
themselves, exist at various levels of generality.”). 
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generality. And there does not seem to be a good—or at least 
consistent—way to select a level of generality at which to describe the 
past practices and a current statute. For example, a significant point of 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Printz concerned 
how to characterize prior practices. The dissent maintained that the 
statute impressing state executives into federal service fell within the 
historical tradition of Congress pressing state officers into federal 
service. The majority, however, defined the relevant historical 
tradition more narrowly, such that the statute fell outside of it. It 
maintained that Congress only impressed state judges into federal 
service. The opinions in NFIB also disagreed about how to characterize 
the relevant statute and the ones that came before it. They parted ways 
over whether Congress’s regulation of individuals who were not part 
of the interstate market for health care fell within the historical 
tradition of Congress regulating individuals who were not part of 
interstate markets in drugs (as in Gonzales v. Raich398) or wheat (as in 
Wickard v. Filburn399). Some of the opinions maintained that the 
statute was different because the statute directly compelled individuals 
to purchase an unwanted good. The same difficulty arose in Free 
Enterprise Fund: Was the relevant tradition “single for-cause removal” 
such that a double layer of for-cause removal fell outside of the 
tradition, as the majority maintained? Or was the relevant tradition 
“insulation” from presidential control such that the statute fell within 
the historical tradition, as the dissent maintained?  
Under the limiting-principle approach to the Court’s antinovelty 
rhetoric, these determinations can change the outcome of a case. 
Determining whether a statute is new affects whether a statute is 
presumed constitutional. If the statute is “new,” judges would then 
determine whether the statute is constitutional based on the 
Constitution’s original meaning. If the statute is not new, judges would 
determine that existing doctrine already establishes that the statute is 
constitutional. The determination about how to characterize the 
relevant past practice involves a fair amount of choice. It is unlikely 
that any past practice or statute would resemble a new statute at its 
most specific level of abstraction; otherwise, that exact same statute 
would already exist. Therefore, judges will need to specify a tradition, 
 
 398. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 399. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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beyond the one contained in the new statute, that fairly represents the 
statutes that have come before it.400  
Courts adopting antinovelty rhetoric also must choose the 
relevant time period to assess whether a statute is new. The cases differ 
about which time period includes potentially relevant congressional 
practice. The Court in Printz and Alden claimed that statutes enacted 
in the last fifty years “[were] of little relevance . . . . [T]hey [were] of 
such recent vintage that they [were] no more probative than the statute 
before [them] of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the 
text.”401 The Court in Noel Canning, by contrast, represented that it has 
previously “treated practice as an important interpretive factor even 
when the nature or longevity of that practice [was] subject to dispute, 
and even when that practice began after the founding era.”402 
Moreover, before the Court adopted antinovelty rhetoric, prior 
Justices had suggested in INS v. Chadha403 that Congress’s recent 
enactment of many, similar statutes made it more likely that those 
statutes were unconstitutional: “[O]ur inquiry is sharpened rather than 
blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing 
with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to 
executive and independent agencies.”404  
Defining novelty is arbitrary in other ways as well. The principle 
appears to be concerned with the number of similar federal statutes—
that is, has Congress, in a certain time period, enacted several similar 
 
 400. The same difficulty of selecting a level of generality at which to define past practices also 
arises in the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. When adjudicating a case that purportedly 
involves a fundamental right, judges must define what fundamental right is at issue before asking 
whether that fundamental right is protected by the Constitution, which in turn depends in part on 
whether that right has been “traditionally protected by our society.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion). Two scholars who have defended the Court’s 
fundamental rights doctrine against charges of arbitrariness have suggested one way to save the 
fundamental rights doctrine is for judges to identify guiding principles and significant lines of 
reasoning from prior cases. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 397, at 1103–05. But the limiting-principle 
approach disavows as incorrect many—if not most—prior cases that might guide and constrain 
judges’ decisions.  
 401. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).  
 402. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014); see also id. at 2564 (“[T]hree 
quarters of a century of settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to great weight in a 
proper interpretation of the constitutional provision.”) (citation omitted). Noel Canning also 
defined the minimum duration of an intrasession recess under the Recess Appointments Clause 
based on practice up until the time the case was decided. See id. at 2657 (“We therefore conclude, 
in light of historical practice, that a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is 
presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”). 
 403. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 404. Id. at 944. 
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federal statutes? But why should it not be enough that there is one 
longstanding one? For example, Shelby County suggested that the 
VRA preclearance regime was novel and extraordinary.405 But by 2013, 
a voting preclearance regime had been on the books for over four 
decades.406 Finally, who is to say what number of federal statutes might 
be relevant? In PHH Corp., the D.C. Circuit had to distinguish three 
other independent agencies led by single individuals, as well as the 
many executive agencies that are led by single individuals.407 
The limiting-principles approach to antinovelty raises additional 
administrability concerns because it is not clear how judges would 
determine whether a statute is constitutional once they have concluded 
that it is novel. Once a judge determines that a statute is not on all fours 
with previous ones, the judge is to determine whether the statute is 
constitutional by consulting only the original public meaning of the text 
without the aid of the last two hundred years of doctrine and practice. 
The limiting-principle approach effectively renders a large subset of 
the U.S. Reports nonprecedential outside of the case’s specific facts 
because those cases are purportedly inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Judges, therefore, could not rely on 
those cases in the ways that judges ordinarily do, by identifying their 
essential facts and reasoning from them. The D.C. Circuit’s treatment 
of Humphrey’s Executor in the PHH Corp. decision invalidating the 
CFPB’s structure is instructive. The court framed the question as 
whether it should “extend the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Executor 
precedent,”408 a decision the court of appeals implied was inconsistent 
with “Article II and the decision in Myers [v. United States].”409 And 
instead of identifying and applying the reasons why Congress had the 
constitutional authority to structure federal agencies,410 the court 
instead dismissively observed that “Humphrey’s Executor does not 
mean that anything goes.”411  
 
 405. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624–25 (2013). 
 406. Id. at 2625 (noting that in the fifty years since adopting the preclearance requirement 
“things ha[d] changed dramatically”). 
 407. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 18–21 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). On February 16, 2017, the D.C. 
Circuit vacated its order in PHH Corp. and scheduled the case to be reheard en banc on May 24, 
2017.  
 408. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 7.  
 409. Id. at 14. 
 410. Instead, the court focused on characteristics of the FTC that were noted in the opinion 
in Humphrey’s Executor. See id. at 14–15. 
 411. Id. at 33. 
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That is a problem if one believes that the system of precedent 
under which judges reason from prior cases protects several important 
systemic values.412 Walling off existing precedent results in 
considerable transition costs, such as the costs associated with 
developing entirely new rules. It would also undermine the rule of 
law—specifically, the values of uniformity and consistency—for judges 
to announce that, going forward, the reasoning in all previous 
separation-of-powers and federalism cases do not guide their decisions. 
There is much constitutional precedent compared to very little text, 
and because that judicial precedent has driven constitutional 
decisionmaking for decades, it would be difficult to suddenly change 
course. 
Adopting this way of deciding cases would also preclude 
decisionmakers from relying on modern case law, which is one of the 
most easily findable and decipherable sources of constitutional law. 
Foreclosing reliance on precedent may be especially problematic for 
other constitutional decisionmakers, such as legislative and executive 
officials.413 Federal officials, including agency staffers and 
congressional staffers, need to have some sense about whether the 
statute or regulation they are enacting is constitutional. But in a world 
that operates under the limiting-principle approach to legislative 
novelty, there will almost always be a risk that a judge will determine 
that a statute is new.414 And if a judge determines that the statute or 
regulation is new, the judge will assess its constitutionality by 
consulting the original meaning of the enacted constitutional text. 
Accordingly, to try and ascertain whether a regulation or statute is 
constitutional, agency and congressional staffers would have to do the 
same. But how are they to do so? Should they conduct an archival 
search and immerse themselves in public thinking at the time? Federal 
officials are probably not well equipped to perform that inquiry, nor 
should they have to be. Yet the limiting-principle approach to 
antinovelty would have the entire federal administrative branch and 
 
 412. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis protects the principles of 
constancy, generality, institutional responsibility, and fidelity). 
 413. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1491–92 (2013) 
(“Legislative and executive officials . . . necessarily operate against the backdrop of judicial 
precedent.”). 
 414. This risk is in part because operationalizing the principle is difficult, see supra notes 396–
401 and accompanying text, and because most statutes will be new in some sense or there would 
be little reason to enact them.  
LITMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:03 AM 
2017] DEBUNKING ANTINOVELTY 1487 
legislative officials interpreting historical materials not readily 
available, or perhaps even understandable, to determine whether a 
federal statute or regulation is constitutional.  
3. Viability.  The limiting-principle account of antinovelty 
represents that many significant constitutional decisions are incorrect 
under its preferred approach to constitutional interpretation. It 
maintains that so many federal statutes are unconstitutional today that 
judges cannot plausibly strike them all down. The limiting-principle 
account of antinovelty then urges judges, going forward, to invalidate 
any new statute that is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original 
meaning, and it would probably include many new statutes, given that 
countless existing statutes are purportedly inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s original meaning. 
It is generally considered a serious mark against a constitutional 
theory if it cannot account for decisions that are celebrated as key parts 
of our constitutional tradition. Consider these decisions that upheld 
“new” statutes: 
• South Carolina v. Katzenbach415 upheld the VRA, the statute that 
first put some southern states’ election procedures under federal 
supervision.416 In part because of that statute, “the number of 
African–Americans who are registered and who turn out to cast 
ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years . . . . The 
Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial 
discrimination and integrating the voting process.”417 
• Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States418 upheld the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which banned private entities from discriminating on 
the basis of race.419 
The limiting-principle approach to antinovelty does not require 
judges to invalidate these statutes if they were challenged today.420 But 
it asks judges to apply an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
may have invalidated all of those statutes if it had been used to assess 
the constitutionality of those statutes when they were initially 
 
 415. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 416. Id. at 337. 
 417. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–26 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 418. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 419. Id. at 261. 
 420. But the Supreme Court already invalidated the VRA reauthorization. See Shelby 
County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.  
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upheld.421 That is a problem—constitutional theories are judged, in 
part, by the results they deliver, and this theory cannot get us to 
decisions that, on many accounts, must be justified.422 Moreover, we do 
not know what the next Katzenbach, McCulloch, or Heart of Atlanta 
will be. There may be another federal civil rights statute, and there may 
be another federal statute that addresses a national economic problem. 
Whatever those new statutes are, the method of constitutional 
interpretation that judges will use seems likely to invalidate them.  
IV.  RETHINKING NOVELTY 
Most of what remains of novelty is the idea that if Congress has 
not done something thus far, perhaps it should never be able to do so. 
The idea that legislative novelty is evidence of a constitutional problem 
accordingly suffers from some version of the is–ought fallacy—the 
mere fact that something has not been done thus far does not establish 
that it should never be done.423 The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric relies 
on a descriptive statement about what Congress has done to yield a 
normative conclusion about what Congress should have the authority 
to do for all time. To be sure, there are ways of bridging this gap and 
explaining why descriptive statements about congressional practice 
yield normative answers about the scope of Congress’s constitutional 
authority. But the Supreme Court has yet to attempt to bridge this gap 
for the antinovelty principle.  
 
 421. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 762–63 (1999) 
(“Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch was lambasted at the time as a usurpation . . . . [T]he 
enumeration of powers has largely been vitiated as a limitation on the scope of the national 
government, due in no small measure to the influence of Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch.”); id. at 751–55 (describing other original meanings of the clause); Randy E. Barnett, 
Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 594 (2010) (noting how Heart of Atlanta relied on an even broader 
construction than McCulloch). The Voting Rights Act was certainly new, but whether it was 
consistent with the Constitution’s “original meaning” is less clear. See generally Michael W. 
McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997) (arguing that Congress has broader enforcement powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments than Supreme Court doctrine recognizes).  
 422. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 2030. (“More generally, it counts as a serious strike against an 
interpretive philosophy that it requires courts to overturn precedents that are not only part of our 
national culture but also celebrated as such.”). 
 423. See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293–306 (David Fate 
Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) (introducing the is–ought fallacy); Eugene Volokh, The 
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1077–82 (2003) (explaining is–ought 
as a “heuristic,” though not necessarily a fallacy). 
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This Part suggests that there may still be a role for legislative 
novelty, but not in determining whether a statute is constitutional. 
Once a federal judge has determined that a statute is unconstitutional 
without reference to the statute’s novelty, the judge could then 
consider the statute’s novelty in deciding whether to actually invalidate 
the statute and ultimately hold it unconstitutional.  
This approach to legislative novelty may be particularly useful in 
areas of underenforced constitutional norms. Professor Larry Sager 
initially described underenforced constitutional norms as ideals that 
are embodied in the Constitution but that judges, for various reasons, 
cannot fashion into judicially enforceable standards.424 One of Sager’s 
examples of an underenforced constitutional norm was the Equal 
Protection Clause: “Under th[e] federal judicial construct of the equal 
protection clause”425 that is the “permissive strand”426 of rational basis 
review, “only a small part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal 
and unjust treatment by government is seriously considered by the 
federal courts; the vast majority of such claims are dismissed out of 
hand.”427 When faced with a constitutional claim premised on an 
underenforced constitutional norm, judges may encounter a statute 
that offends the constitutional norm—say “unequal and unjust 
treatment by government”—but that is not identified as such by the 
doctrine designed to enforce the norm. In such a case, the court may 
seek to draw limited, rule-like lines that identify specific things that 
Congress cannot do. Used in this context, the antinovelty principle may 
provide some assurances that the judicially crafted rule will not have 
disastrous practical consequences. 
There are, however, two caveats about how this kind of reliance 
on legislative novelty might work. The first is that the statute’s novelty 
is not being used to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional. 
 
 424. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212–13 (1978). In Fallon’s terminology, “a gap frequently, often 
necessarily, exists between the meaning of constitutional norms and the tests by which those 
norms are implemented.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 60 (1997). Another way of thinking about 
the relationship between doctrine and the Constitution is the distinction between interpretation 
and construction. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 95–96 (2010) (explaining that interpretation refers to the act of discerning 
constitutional meaning, whereas construction refers to how that meaning is implemented into 
legally enforceable rules). 
 425. Sager, supra note 424, at 1216. 
 426. Id. at 1215. 
 427. Id. at 1216.  
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Novelty instead enters into the analysis only once a judge has 
determined that a statute violates some constitutional norm based on 
other considerations. Those other considerations include: precedent 
and the reasons animating the results in prior cases (including modern 
cases); congressional practice, meaning whether a new statute is 
meaningfully different from other statutes (including recently enacted 
ones); constitutional text (including glosses on the text provided by 
doctrine and practice); historical materials not limited to particular 
periods in time; and considerations of substantive and moral justice.  
The second caveat is that whatever rule the court fashions to 
explain why the statute is unconstitutional must itself be coherent. The 
line between what is prohibited and what is permissible must make 
some sense of the relevant constitutional norm—whether it be the 
scope of Congress’s delegated powers vis-à-vis the states or the scope 
of Congress’s powers vis-à-vis the other branches of the federal 
government. Whatever line a court draws must be able to coherently 
explain how an unconstitutional statute is meaningfully different from 
permissible ones. Used in this way, novelty could conceivably play a 
secondary role when judges are attempting to adjudicate vague 
constitutional norms. When judges want to identify a statute as 
unconstitutional on the basis of an underenforced constitutional norm, 
the fact that Congress has never passed a similar statute may provide 
some assurances that finding the statute unconstitutional will not result 
in many other statutes also being held unconstitutional.  
In some ways, this account of legislative novelty is similar to how 
the decision in New York was originally premised on legislative 
novelty. The New York Court identified government practices that 
had, by the time of the decision, become firmly rooted and quite 
common, such as conditions attached to states when they received 
federal money. But the Court assured that the practice of ordering 
state legislatures to enact federal law was not similarly firmly rooted or 
common. The rule announced in New York, however, may fail the two 
“caveats” to relying on legislative novelty: there are strong arguments 
that the text, original meaning, doctrine, and other constitutional 
metrics aside from the statute’s novelty did not suggest that the 
Constitution forbids Congress from requiring state legislatures to enact 
federal directives.428 Strong arguments could also be made to show that, 
 
 428. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 168, at 1030–60. Caminker notes, “The text does not, 
either explicitly or implicitly, clearly generate the Court’s sharp distinction between judicial and 
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with respect to the values federalism purportedly serves, federal 
directives are not meaningfully different from conditions attached to 
federal funds or conditions attached to preemption schemes, both of 
which are constitutionally permissible.429  
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s antinovelty rhetoric should be abandoned. Congress’s 
failure to enact a statute rarely reflects prior Congresses’ assumption 
that it lacks the constitutional power to do so. Antinovelty rhetoric, 
accordingly, should not serve as a means of incorporating Congress’s 
constitutional assumptions into judicial constitutional interpretations. 
Legislative novelty is not a sign that a law is actually unconstitutional, 
nor should legislative novelty be used as evidence indicating that a 
statute is unconstitutional. Nothing in the conventional sources of 
constitutional law suggests that a federal statute’s novelty is evidence 
that the statute is unconstitutional, and a presumption that novel 
federal statutes are unconstitutional would be difficult to 
operationalize in a defensible, coherent way. Using legislative novelty 
as evidence that a statute is unconstitutional serves little purpose, and 
it could prevent ordinary and legitimate congressional innovation. 
Constitutional law will always, in some sense, be about change. 
“[I]n almost every instance of the exercise of . . . power differences are 
asserted from previous exercises of it and made a ground of attack.”430 
Although novelty may precipitate constitutional challenges, it should 
not be used to resolve them. 
 
nonjudicial commandeering, and other evidence of the Framers’ original intent actually counters” 
this distinction. Id. at 1059.  
 429. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634, 1657 (2006). 
 430. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). In a dissenting opinion to NFIB, Justice 
Ginsburg cites briefs from the losing side of three landmark cases that expanded federal power, 
including the Brief for Petitioner in Perez v. United States (claiming an “unprecedented exercise 
of power”), the Supplemental Brief for Appellees in Katzenbach v. McClung (referencing a 
“novel assertion of federal power”), and the Brief for Appellee in Wickard v. Filburn (describing 
a “complete departure”). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first quoting Brief for Petitioner at 5, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146 (1971) (No. 600); then quoting Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 40, Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (No. 543); and then quoting Brief for Appellee at 6, Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (No. 543)). 
